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When you expand the civil rights struggle to the level of human
rights, you can then take the case of the black man in this country
before the nations in the United Nations. You can take it before a
world court. But the only level you can do it on is the level of
human rights. Civil rights keeps you under his restrictions, under
hisjurisdiction. Civil rights keeps you in hispocket. . . expand the
civil rights struggle to the level of human rights, take it into the
United Nations, where our African brothers can throw their weight
on our side, where our Latin-American brothers can throw their
weight on our side, and where 800 million Chinamen are sitting
there waiting to throw their weight on our side.
Malcolm X'
December 10, 1978 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the
United Nations.2 In anticipation of this anniversary the Economic
and Social Council and the General Assembly joined in recom-
mending a general review of existing United Nations approaches to
the promotion and observance of human rights.'
This article reviews the development of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights to determine whether the Declaration's
promise of universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms has been fulfilled by the adoption of the
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Denver. Northwestern Uni-
versity; Ph.D., 1975, American University; J.D., 1977.
1. MALCOLM X, MALCOLM X SPEAKS 23 (1966), as citedin Bilder, Re-Thinking Inter-
national Human Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 171, 183 n. 19 (1969).
2. U.N. Doc. A/811 (December 10, 1965). The United Nations Declaration adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by a vote of 48 in favor and 0 against. Eight
States abstained - Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine
S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia.
3. United Nations Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Human
Rights. U.N. Doc. OPI/621, at 166 (1978).
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International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.4 The Civil
and Political Covenant will also be examined, for, as one commen-
tator remarked, the United Nations human rights instruments have
"received much less systematic scholarly attention than have the
comparable endeavours of various regional and specialized organi-
zations. '
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Status of the Individual in International Law
The Treaty of Westphalia in 1948 ushered in an international
order based on the sovereignty and sovereign equality of nation-
states.' Under this system the individual was not recognized as
possessing any rights, while the nation-state retained complete dis-
cretion as to the way in which it treated both its nationals and state-
less persons. This Westphalian view of the individual as having no
rights or standing under international law has, up until recently,
dominated jurisprudential thinking.7
4. U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1496, Provisional. The Covenant was unanimously adopted on
December 16, 1966, 106 in favor and 0 against.
5. Buergenthal, International and Regional Human Rights Law and Institutions.- Some
Examples of Their Interaction, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 321 (1977). Individuals interested in
exploring the literature in the human rights field should consult: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (J.
Bridge, D. Lasok, D. Perrott and R. Plender eds. 1973); J. CAREY, U.N. PROTECTION OF
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1970). COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS (R. Claude ed. 1976);
M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS (1962); A. DEL. Russo, INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1971); P. DROST, HUMAN RIGHTS AS LEGAL RIGHTS (1965); I.
DUCHACEK, RIGHTS & LIBERTIES IN THE WORLD TODAY: CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE &
REALITY (1973); INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (A. Eide and A. Schou
eds. 1968) (Nobel Symposium 7); M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1962); E. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION (1970); THE
HUMAN RIGHT To INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (L. Kutner ed. 1970); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950); THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (E. Luard ed. 1967); J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW (D.
Anson trans. 1943); HUMAN RIGHTS (A. Melden ed. 1970); M. MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL
CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS (1974); HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (A. Robertson ed. 1968); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
(1972); E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1964); L.B.
SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973);
United Nations, United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights U.N. Do. ST/HR/2
(1974); United Nations, The Realization of Economic Social and Cultural Rights." Problems,
Policies, Progress U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/I 131/Rev.l (1974); AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (F. Vallat ed. 1972); V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED
STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY (1970).
6. See Lane, Demanding Human Rights. A Change in the World Legal Order, 6 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 269 (1978).
7. I.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 292, at 641 (8th ed. H. Lau-
terpacht ed. 1955). For a contrary point of view see generally H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note
2
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The orthodox positivist doctrine has been explicit in the affirma-
tion that only states are subjects of international law. In those
cases in which individuals seem to derive benefits under interna-
tional law, the predominant view has been that such benefits are
enjoyed not by virtue of a right which international law gives to
the individual, but by reason of a right appertaining to the State
of which the individual is a national. . . . Similarly, if individu-
als have no rights under international law, it seems to follow that
they can have no locus standi before international tribunals and
other international agencies.
8
The traditional status of the individual in international law is
recognized by Oppenheim.
Since the Law of Nations is based on the common consent of
individual states, and not of individual human beings, States
solely and exclusively. . . are the subjects of International Law.
This means that the Law of Nations is a law for international
conduct of States, and not of their citizens. . . . An individual
human being . . . is never directly a subject of International
Law.
9
But what is the real position of individuals in International Law,
if they are not subjects thereof? The answer can only be that
they are objects of the Law of Nations.1
0
Since the individual can never be "the subject" of interna-
tional law, the individual can only obtain rights through an interna-
tional treaty indirectly, through the act of "transformation" by the
individual's nation-state.
[T]he traditional theory has denied the possibility of any direct
relation between international and municipal law. If individuals
can never be subjects of international rights and duties then ac-
cording to that view, the rules of international law can have no
immediate effect, without a previous act of transformation, upon
the municipal law of the State."
Traditionally, alien residents who were entitled to be treated in
accordance with the "minimum standards of civilization," were the
only individuals recognized as having rights under international
5, G. EZEJIOFOR, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW (1964). There is gen-
eral agreement that a state may assume legal obligations towards individuals by virtue of an
international agreement. See Case Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danziq,
[1928-30] P.C.I.J. Ser. B., No. 15.
8. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 6-8.
9. I.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, para. 13, at 20-21 (A.D.
McNair ed. 1928).
10. Id para. 290, at 521..
11. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 8.
Vol. 10
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law.' 2 These rights were qualified by the fact that any right of ac-
tion arising from a violation of a state's duty towards the alien resi-
dent resided exclusively in the alien's state of nationality, with any
compensation received for the injury belonging to that state. The
Permanent Court of International Justice observed that "[b]y tak-
ing up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic
action or international 'judicial' proceedings on his behalf, a State
is in reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the per-
son of its subjects, respect for the rules of International Law."' 3
The individual's lack of status in classical international juris-
prudence has been matched by the failure of international diplo-
macy and customary international law to address, until recently,
the matter of individual human rights.
B. International Efforts Prior to World War II
Prior to the nineteenth century nation-states demonstrated lit-
tle concern for the international human rights of individuals.14
Those limited efforts in the field of human rights focused on the
self-determination of peoples, the prohibition of slavery, religious
freedom and the regulation of the prohibition of the law against
war. 15
Nineteenth century efforts at encouraging the self-determina-
tion of peoples were motivated by a desire to serve nation-state self-
interest. For instance, British efforts to foster independence for the
Spanish colonies of Latin America furthered British commercial
and political interests.' 6 The British activity of establishing in-
dependent states from the control of the Ottoman and Austrian
12. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by Slates to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325,
327 (1967).
13. Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions Case, 11927] P.C.I.J., ser. A., Vol. 2, No. 10.
See also Nottebohm Case (second phase) [1955] I.C.J. 4, 24. A thorough discussion is con-
tained in Brownlie, The Place of the Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 441, 461
(1964); Bin Cheng, The Contribution of International Courts and Tribunals to the Protection of
Human Rights Under International Customary Law, in A. Eide and A. Schou eds., supra note
5, at 167. Another option available to states, in certain situations, is forcible self-help, see
generally Lillich, supra note 12, at 325.
14. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 120.
15. See generally Burns, The Rights ofMan Since the Reformation.: An Historical Study,
in F. Vallat ed., supra note 5, at 16; Castberg, Natural Law and Human Rights. An Idea-
Historical Survey, in A. Eide and A. Schou eds., supra note 5; Luard, The Origins of Interna-
tional Concern Over Human Rights, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 7; H. LAUTERPACHT,
sUpra note 5, at 73-141; Said, Pursuing Human Dignity in HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
ORDER (A. Said ed. 1978).
16. Luard, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 10.
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Empires, while furthering human rights, was also designed to frus-
trate Russian expansionism. 7
Not all international human rights concerns were centered in
domestic policy. Slavery was an issue which evoked international
concern to such a degree that it was abolished by the seventeen
signatory nations to the 1890 Brussels Agreement.' International
indignation and protest was also evoked by the war atrocities com-
mitted by Turkish troops in Bulgaria in 1876 and Armenia in 1894.
Anger was also aroused by Russian pogroms against the Jews in
1891, and by King Leopold's repressive administration of the
Congo in 1905.19 However, it was the barbarities of the Crimean
War which finally awakened the Western World to the necessity of
protecting the rights of both combatants and non-combatants.2 °
The Declaration of Paris of 1856 set forth principles governing neu-
tral shipping and prohibiting privateering.21 In 1856, the Declara-
tion of St. Petersburg outlawed the use of certain types of
explosives and inflammable bullets, and the Geneva Convention of
1864 laid down conditions governing the treatment of wounded in
the field. 22 This movement culminated in the Hague Conferences
of 1899 and 1907, which established detailed rules for land and na-
val warfare as well as for the treatment of prisoners of war.23
Individual States also began to incorporate clauses in their
treaties guaranteeing freedom of religious practice as a means of
insuring international peace. For example, general religious rights
were assured for the people of Serbia, Montenegro and Rumania
under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.24
Overall, these early international efforts at protecting human
rights
remained for the most part spasmodic and unorganized. [They]
had few recognized channels of expression .... And only on
matters arousing especially intense feelings, such as slavery,
the treatment of prisoners and wounded in war, or over specific
atrocities attracting widespread publicity, such as those in
17. Id.
18. See McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, The Protection ofRespect and Human Rights.-
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. UNIv. L. REV. 919, 958-60 (1975).




23. See Gutteridge, War and Human Rights, in F. Vallat ed., supra note 5, at 99.
24. Id at 13. Luard, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 13. Prior to this time efforts had
been made by members of one religion exclusively on behalf of their co-religionists.
Vol. 10
5
Lippman: Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human Rights Under the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED
Bulgaria or the Congo, was any effective action normally
taken.25
The formation of the League of Nations at the end of World
War I was perhaps the first attempt at providing individuals with
both a right and a remedy under international law. 26 Although the
protection of human rights received little overall discussion at the
Versailles Conference,2 7 the question of the rights of minorities
within a state dominated by another nationality received a great
deal of attention.2 a
On the one hand, with the disappearance of multi-national, non-
racial states, such as the old Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Em-
pires, almost every European nation came to be dominated by a
single nationality which, without special measures of protection,
might abuse its position at the expense of the minorities. On the
other [hand], the ideal of self-determination itself presupposed a
special concern to protect all national groups even if, for reasons
of their geographical distribution, they were not able to enjoy
that right in a direct form.29
Pragmatic motivations were also behind this concern for minorities.
President Wilson observed that the "Great Powers" did not want to
leave "elements of disturbance unremoved which . . .would dis-
turb the peace of the world.""0
With this concern for minority groups, "all new or substan-
tially enlarged states then coming within the purview of the [New
States] Committee's work," were required to assume obligations for
the protection of their minorities "as a condition to the recognition
by the Powers of their independence or new frontiers, or of their
admission to the League."'3 1 The treaties stipulated that their provi-
sions established obligations of international concern placing the
rights of "persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minori-
25. Id at 14.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See generally Macartney, League of Nations Protection of Minority Rights, in E.
Luard ed., supra note 5, at 22; P. Anker, The Mandates System.- Origin-Principles-Application
(L.N. Publ. 1945.VI.A.1); H. HALL, MANDATES, DEPENDENCIES AND TRUSTEESHIP (1948);
0. WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1930).
29. Luard, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 14.
30. Id at 24.
3 1. Macartney, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 23, lists the instruments under League
Control as: Treaties: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bul-
garia, Hungary, Turkey. Declarations: Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Iraq. Local
Conventions: Poland and Danzig, Finland, Germany and Poland, Memel. Conventions on
exchange of populations: Greece and Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.
6
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ties" "under the guarantee of the League of Nations."32 The mi-
nority treaties 33  "guaranteed such rights as freedom from
discrimination in civil and political affairs, and the free exercise of
speech and religion." Any member of the Council of the League
had standing to bring to the attention of the Council any state in-
fringement of treaty obligations. The Council was authorized to
take such action as it felt proper, and, as a last resort, disputes could
be submitted to the International Court of Justice for settlement.
34
The cumulative effect of these provisions was to change the entire
relationship between those persons in the designated minorities and
their country of residency or citizenship. In theory, the countries
obligated under the minority treaties were no longer free to act with
unlimited discretion toward protected minorities.35
The states subject to the minority treaties thus perceived them-
selves as having been singled out for persecution, while, at the same
time, the administrative ineffectiveness of the League lead to the
alienation and frustration of minority groups in the treaty states.
The League minority protection system was also criticized for hav-
ing failed to provide protections for those minority groups who
were later to suffer persecution, such as the Jews in Germany and
national minorities in the Soviet Union.36  This failure of the
League minority protection system, coupled with the massive
human rights violations accompanying World War II, served to
32. Id. at 25.
33. Id.
34. For details of the minority treaties, see id at 27, 28.
35. Ferguson, The United Nations Human Rights Covenants; Problems of Raqfication and
Implementation, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
SIXTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING (April 25-27, 1968) 83, 85. For the international human
rights established in the treaties, see M. GANJI, supra note 5, at 46.
36. The League of Nations did leave a significant legacy of human rights and humanita-
rian activities which has served as an inspiration to the human rights program of the United
Nations. A Committee on slavery undertook a study of slavery in the world and was respon-
sible for an anti-slavery convention in 1922. An Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Wo-
men and Children was also established. A refugees' organization which survived the life of
the league secured resettlement of over two million refugees from Russia, Turkey and East-
ern Europe. Another central achievement was the establishment of an International Labor
Organization. A Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs also was
formed. Other activities involved a Committee on International Co-operation which pro-
moted intellectual freedom and the position of intellectuals. A health office, predecessor to
the World Health Organization, was active in the area of public health. An organization
known as the International Relief Union worked in disaster relief. Additionally, a mandate
system was established in former German and Turkish colonies. The mandate system was
based on the principle that such people "form a sacred trust of civilization," Luard, in E.
Luard ed., supra note 5, at 16-21. Luard suggests that these developments assisted in the
development of viewing individuals as possessing rights under International Law. Id. at 21.
Vol. 10
7
Lippman: Human Rights evisited: The Protection of Human Rights Under the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED
motivate the Allied Powers to consider a comprehensive interna-
tional human rights program.
II. EARLY U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY
A4. The U.N. Charter
World War II heightened the awareness of the Allied Powers
to human rights. The Allied war aims proclaimed by President
Roosevelt in his "four freedoms" speech to the United States Con-
gress on January 6, 1941 were; freedom of speech, freedom of wor-
ship, freedom from want and freedom from fear throughout the
world.3 7 Roosevelt referred to these "four freedoms" as "necessary
conditions of peace," and emphasized that these were not ideals of
a "distant millennium."38 Subsequently, on August 14, 1941, the
Atlantic Charter was signed, with the hope that following the de-
struction of Nazi tyranny there would be established "a peace
which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety
within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that
all the men in all the land may live out their lives in freedom from
want and fear."39 This concern for international human rights was
reiterated in the Declaration of United Nations of January 1,
1942. 4 The Declaration stated that "complete victory over their
enemies [was] essential to defend life, liberty, independence and re-
ligious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their
own lands as well as in other lands.'
In 1944, representatives of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom,
United States and China met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington
D.C. and agreed to form the United Nations; an international or-
ganization designed to achieve peace and cooperation among na-
37. 87 CONG. REC., H46-47, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (Daily ed. Jan. 6. 1941).
38. Id.
39. Quoted in Humphrey, The UN. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 39.
40. Id.
41. Id at 40, EzEJIOFOR, supra note 7, at 54. Another example of human rights protec-
tion inspired by the Second World War are the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 in which each of
the defeated states undertook "to take all measures necessary to secure to all peoples under
its jurisdiction," without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, "(tihe enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms," including freedom of expression, freedom of the
press and publication, freedom of religious worship and freedom of political opinion and
public meeting. See the following treaties, Italy article 15; Romania article 3(1); Bulgaria
article 2, and 30 (1948); Martin, Human Rights in the Paris Peace Treaty, 24 BRIT. YEARBOOK
INT'L L. 392-98 (1947); see also Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65 and 27;
and discussion in Humphrey, supra note 39, at 40.
8
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tions. One of the proposed purposes of the United Nations was
"international cooperation in the solution of international eco-
nomic, social and other humanitarian problems and the promotion
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."42 These
purposes served as an inspiration for the various provisions of the
United Nations Charter pertaining to human rights.43 The Charter
recognizes that the maintenance of international peace and security
and the protection of human rights are interdependent," and it
proclaims the promotion of human rights as one of the major aims
of the United Nations.45 It provides a framework for the develop-
ment of United Nations organs concerned with human rights,46 and
it provides for the drafting of instruments in the field of human
rights. 7 It also imposes upon both the member states and the or-
42. See G. EzEiIOFOR, supra note 7, at 54-55. The original Dumbarton Oaks proposal
on human rights sponsored by the Soviet Union, United States, United Kingdom and China
read:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for the peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the organization
should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian
problems and freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be
vested in the general assembly in the Economic and Social Council.
As a result of pressure from smaller nations and private N.G.O.'s this was amended at the
San Francisco Conference to read:
With a view to the creation of stability and well-being which are necessary for the
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and se/f-determination ofpeoples, the organization should facilitate so-
lutions of international economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems and
promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedomsfor all without distinc-
tion as to race, language, religion and sex. Responsibility for the discharge of this
function should be vested in the General Assembly in the Economic and Social
Council.
43. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 39, at 39; G. EzEiIOFOR, supra note 7, at 54-
55. Humphrey credits the incorporation of these protections in the Charter to the efforts of
certain small countries and forty-two private organizations present as consultants to the
United States delegation. Sohn comments on the motivation behind inclusion of the human
rights clauses in the United Nations Charter:
The reasons for including these provisions in the Charter were many. Some coun-
tries, such as the United States and France, have long pioneered in the development
of Bills of Rights for the protection of their own citizens, and their representatives
felt that humanity as a whole should benefit from their experience. Others wanted
to prevent the repetition of the totalitarian atrocities of the 1930's which shocked
the conscience of mankind. Another group, dissatisfied with the workings of the
minority treaties which were imposed on some states of Eastern Europe and the
Middle East after the First World War, felt that the problem of protection of mi-
norities can be solved only in the broader framework of a Bill of Rights applicable
to all.
Sohn, as quoted in L.B. SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 504-06.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id.
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ganization a responsibility to promote human rights. 48
The first explicit reference in the United Nations Charter to
human rights is in the second clause of the Preamble,49 ironically
drafted by Field Marshal Smuts of South Africa." It states that the
"peoples of the United Nations", not merely limited to the member
states or organizations, "reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, .. in the dignity and worth of the human person" and in
the "equal rights of men and women."
The second explicit reference to human rights is found in Arti-
cle 1(3), which includes among the stated "Purposes and Princi-
ples" of the United Nations, the achievement of "international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion .. ,,5 I
48. McDougal and Bebr, Human Rights In The United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603,
612 (1964).
49. G. EZEJIOFOR, supra note 7, at 56.
50. Smuts was a strong verbal advocate of human rights at the San Francisco Confer-
ence. G. EzUjIOFOR, supra note 7, at 56 quotes Smuts' statement at the 6th Plenary Session,
1st May 1948:
I would suggest that the Charter should contain at its very outset, and in the pream-
ble, a declaration of human rights and of common faith which had sustained the
Allied Peoples in their bitter and prolonged struggles for the vindication of these
rights and that faith. . We have fought for justice and decency and for the funda-
mental freedoms and rights of man, which are basic to all human advancement and
progress and peace.
Some would argue that General Smuts' close involvement in the human rights movement at
the San Francisco Conference is evidence of the purely "symbolic" intent behind the human
rights provisions. Conversation with Dr. Martin Chanock, Senior Lecturer, Legal Studies
Department, La Trobe University. This argument, may have validity, but Smuts' advocacy
of human rights cannot be utilized as evidence that all governments viewed the human rights
movement as "symbolic." For instance, some smaller states were proponents of a strong
U.N. human rights program. Chile, Cuba and Panama all put forward proposals which
would have made the United Nations guarantee the protection of specified human rights.
Panama urged incorporation of a bill of rights. These proposals were rejected as giving the
new organization too much power in the sensitive area of human rights. In the end, drafting
of additional protections was left to the Human Rights Commission, Humphrey, in E. Luard
ed., supra note 5, at 40, 41.
51. L.B. SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 510-11 contains comments by
L.B. Sohn on the history of article 1(3). At the San Francisco Conference, Committee I/I
adopted the sponsoring powers' proposal for the promotion and encouragement of respect
for human rights with only minor drafting changes. Costa Rica questioned whether "pro-
mote" might not only authorize the propagation of ideas and principles by the U.N., but also
authorize the coercion of states to comply with human rights principles. Costa Rica objected
to any authorization of the United Nations to use coercion and wanted it stated that the
functions of the organization "are purely cultural." In contrast, other delegations suggested
that "promote" be replaced by stronger phraseology such as "to assure" or "to protect." The
Committee held that "assuring or protecting human rights was the concern of each state,
10
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Article 13(b) imposes the obligation on the General Assembly
to "initiate studies" and "make recommendations" for the purpose
of "promoting international cooperation in the economic, social,
cultural, educational and health fields, and assisting in the realiza-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Much of the human
rights and humanitarian work of the General Assembly and the
Third Committee, which concerns itself with social, humanitarian
and cultural affairs, is authorized under Article 13. Additional pro-
visions respecting human rights include Articles 55(c),52  56,
unless such rights and freedoms were so grievously outraged so as to threaten international
peace or obstruct the application of the Charter." Despite the modest language of article
1(3), Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 41, points out that it is "of more than
rhetorical importance." Article 1(3) has been used on a number of occasions as an interna-
tional standard to which states should conform. In a report submitted to the General Assem-
bly by the United Nations Commission on the racial situation in the Union of South Africa it
was stated that certain measures adopted by that country were contrary to the purposes of
article 1(3) of the Charter. See Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organization, Supp.
No. 1, Vol. 1, Art. 1, para. 21. Another example of reference being made to article 1(3) was
in 1955 when the General Assembly instructed its Committee on Information From Non-
Self-Governing Territories to examine summaries and analyses of article 73(e) "in the spirit
of article 1, paras. 3 and 4". According to Humphrey, "it is clear that the Assembly can and
will undertake investigations, and make recommendations to member states, concerning the
application of the purposes of the organization. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note
5, at 41-42.
52. At the San Francisco Conference, "Committee 1I/3 incorporated into the text of
article 55 of the Charter an Australian proposal that the Organization should promote not
only respect for human rights, but also their 'observance.'" This was explained as an at-
tempt to strengthen article 55. "Respect" was interpreted by Australia to connote passivity
and the addition of "observance" was intended to imply active implementation and an obli-
gation on state parties to implement the provisions of article 55. L.B. SOHN AND T. Bu-
ERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 511.
53. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 42-43 comments that articles 55 and 56
"probably creates the only clear legal obligations in the Charter on members to promote
respect for human rights. Humphrey supports this argument by pointing to the language of
various United Nations resolutions. For instance, a 1952 General Assembly resolution on
South Africa stated that "governmental policies of member states which are not directed
towards these goals (e.g. equality before the law), but which are designed to perpetuate or
increase discrimination, are inconsistent with the pledges of the members under article 56 of
the Charter." J. CAREY, supra note 5, at 168 agrees with Humphrey and quotes U. Thant as
commenting in reference to article 56 that "Perhaps the boldest innovation of the Charter
was the unconditional and universal obligation in regard to human rights and fundamental
freedoms," Statement at opening of forty-fifth session of ECOSOC Geneva, July 8, 1968.
U.N. press release SG/SM/971 - ECOSOC/2474 (1968).
Note: Article 56 refers to action in "cooperation with the organization." The Dumbar-
ton Oaks proposals contained no such provision while the San Francisco Conference con-
templated a three-fold pledge to take "separate and joint action" and "to co-operate with the
organization." Although Article 56 precludes any obligation to take any action independent
of the United Nations, L.M. Goodrich and E.I. Hambro suggest that it obligates Member
States, "to refrain from obstructionist acts and to co-operate in good faith in the achievement
Vol. 10
11
Lippman: Human Rights Revisited: The Protection of Human ights Under the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED
62(2)- 4 and 68:55
The final explicit reference to human rights in the Charter is
Article 76(1), which establishes as one of the basic objectives of the
United Nations trusteeship system, inter alia, the obligation of
member states
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language
or religion.
5 6
Various other articles of the Charter, though not including ex-
plicit human rights provisions, may, in certain circumstances, pro-
of the purposes of Article 56." L.M. GOODRICH AND E.I. HAMBRO, THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 320 (1946). The history of Article 56 is confused. Both the pledge in
Article 56 and the full employment clause in Article 55(a) originated in an Australian propo-
sal according to which members of the United Nations were to take action to secure "eco-
nomic rights, for all who seek it." The United States objected that the language of Articles
55 and 56 might involve the United Nations in the domestic affairs of Member States and
pursuant to the United States' objection it was agreed that the report of the Committee
should state explicitly that "nothing contained in Chapter IX can be construed as giving
authority to the Organization to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states." Sohn,
in L.B. SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 512-13. The United States also ob-
jected to a proposal of Sub-committee 11/3/A that members of the United Nations should
"pledge themselves to take separate and joint action to cooperate with the Organization and
with each other to achieve these purposes." Australia interpreted this to require Nations to
pursue this objective both within the United Nations and within the domestic sphere. The
Sub-committee revised the original draft to require Nations to "undertake to co-operate
jointly and severally with the Organization for the achievement of these purposes." This
modification in phraseology was justified by the United States on the familiar grounds that
any requirement of "separate" action might justify intervention in the domestic affairs of
member states.
Article 56 reaffirms the requirements of Article 55 and contains what appears to be the
clearest commitment to human rights in the U.N. Charter. "All Members pledge themselves
to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement
of the purposes set forth in Article 55."
54. 62(1) empowers the Economic and Social Council to initiate studies and reports
with respect to ". . . international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related
matters .. " Although human rights are not mentioned specifically, Article 62 has served
as a basis for the Council undertaking, though the Commission on Human Rights and other
bodies, many reports, studies and draft conventions.
55. Article 68 is the constitutional basis for the Commission on Human Rights which
has performed the basic work in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
other human rights declarations. Reference to "promoting" respect for human rights was
included after a plea by the United States that the Commission "was expected and hoped for
by a great many people and there would be a profound disappointment if it were not
adopted." Sohn, in L.B. SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 5, at 511-12.
Article 68 inter alia provides that the Economic and Social Council "shall set up com-
missions. . . for the promotion of human rights."
56. J. CAREY, supra note 5, at 143-53 argues that the trusteeship system creates a
"double standard" of protection for human rights by providing greater protection to inhabit-
ants of trustee states than is provided to inhabitants of independent, member states. See also
H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 160-61.
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vide authorization for human rights activities by United Nations
organs. For instance, Article 10 permits the General Assembly to
"discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the pres-
ent Charter," and Article 11(2) permits the General Assembly to
"discuss any questions relating to maintenance of international
peace and security." The Security Council, under Chapter VII, Ar-
ticle 39, shall "determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
[or any] breach of the peace. . . and shall make recommendations,
or decide what measures shall be taken." Article 66(2) authorizes
the Economic and Social Council to "perform services at the re-
quest of members of the United Nations," and provides the consti-
tutional basis for the advisory services program in human rights
under which training fellowships are awarded, seminars are orga-
nized and expert assistance is provided to members. 7
Despite the Charter's expression of concern, "two obvious
weaknesses with respect to human rights are the lack of implemen-
tation machinery and a failure to define human rights.""8 How-
ever, as suggested by President Truman's statement, the expectation
at the San Francisco Conference was that the definition and imple-
mentation of the human rights provisions would be quickly forth-
coming.
Under this document [the Charter] we have good reason to ex-
pect an international bill of rights acceptable to all nations in-
volved. That bill of rights will be as much a part of international
life as our own Bill of Rights is part of our Constitution. The
Charter is dedicated to the achievement and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unless we can attain
those objectives for all men and women everywhere without re-
gard to race, language or religion, we can not have permanent
peace and security in the world.59
A bill of rights embodied in the Charter would have had great
57. For a description of such programs, see United Nations, United Nations Action in the
Field of Human Rights 192 (1974); R. CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 29-30 (1972).
58. G. EZEJIOFOR, supra note 7, at 59.
59. 1 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 717 (1945). Sohn, in L.B. SOHN AND T. BUERGENTHAL, supra
note 5, at 507-10, details the efforts to include a bill of rights in the Charter. Early drafts of
the United Nations Charter prepared by the United States Department of State in 1942 in-
cluded a bill of rights containing "a common program of human rights" to which United
Nations members would have to subscribe. Disagreement arose over inclusion of socio-eco-
nomic rights and measures of implementation. An additional draft of August 14, 1943 in-
cluded an instrument entitled a "Declaration of Human Rights." A provision of the Draft
Charter specified that:
The Members of the United Nations agree to give legislative effect to the Declara-
tion of Human Rights annexed to this Charter. Measures of enforcement shall be
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moral force and authority. Humphrey remarks that, "It is a matter
for regret therefore that the opportunity provided by the San Fran-
applied by the administrative and judicial authorities of each Member without dis-
crimination as to nationality, language, race, political opinion, or religious belief.
In April of 1944 the United States abandoned the idea of preparing a Declaration on
Human Rights. The United States "Plan for a General International Organization" only
contained a provision empowering the General Assembly to initiate studies and make rec-
ommendations for "the promotion of the observance of basic human rights in accordance
with principles or undertakings agreed upon by the states members of the international or-
ganization." The provision was included in the United States "Tentative Proposals for a
General International Organization" submitted to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference by the
United States. At that Conference, the United Kingdom suggested that one of the purposes
of the United Nations should be to "guard man's freedom by institutions for removing social
wrongs" while China proposed that the United Nations should be based on the principle of
equality of races as well as states. In the end, British and Soviet objections to inclusion of
specific human rights obligations in the Charter resulted in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals
containing only one general reference to United Nations promotion of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. See G. EZEJIOFOR, supra note 7.
At the San Francisco Conference a large number of human rights amendments were
submitted. The Sponsoring Governments attempted to compromise by agreeing to incorpo-
rate references to the promotion of human rights and nondiscrimination in the statement of
purposes (later article 1), in the powers of the General Assembly (later article I), in the
powers of the Economic and Social Council (later article 62), in the statement of economic
and social goals (later article 55), and in the provision relating to the setting up of commis-
sions by the Economic and Social Council (later article 68). In explaining these additions to
the Charter, Mr. Edward R. Settinius, Jr., United States Secretary of State noted that they
"are essential if we are to build peace on the basis of justice and freedom for all" and that the
people of the world "rightly demand the active defense and promotion of basic human rights
and fundamental freedoms. It is a matter of elementary justice that the demand be answered
affirmatively." He expressed the hope that the proposed Commission on Human Rights will
"promptly undertake to prepare an international bill of rights which can be accepted by all
the member nations as an integral part of their own systems of law, just as our Bill of Rights
has been an integral part of our system of Law."
Other proposals for human rights protection in the Charter should be noted. Field Mar-
shal Smuts of South Africa suggested that "declaration of human rights" be placed in the
Preamble of the Charter. See G. EZEJIOFOR, supra note 7, at 56. A Columbian submission
called for the Preamble to recognize that individual rights are a "necessary condition of
peace"; a Panamanian proposal suggested inclusion of an "International Bill of Rights" in
the Charter; Uruguay and then in a separate proposal, Mexico, Equador and Chile called for
imposing obligations guaranteeing the "full and complete protection of rights"; Norway
urged that a human rights clause, in addition to being included in the state of Purposes of the
United Nations, be included in the Statement of Principles. Norway pointed out that this
would strengthen human rights protections since expulsion is available as a sanction for vio-
lation of Principles but not for contravention of Organizational Purposes. A New Zealand
proposal urged inclusion of the "Four Freedoms" in the Charter and a joint proposal spon-
sored by Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Mexico and a separate Indian proposal, both
successfully urged insertion of a human rights and anti-discrimination clauses among the
Purposes of the organization. The inclusion in the Charter of a bill of rights was not under-
taken due to a "lack of time" at the San Francisco Conference. See Doc. 723 I/l/A/9, at 10
(1945), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs., at no. 5. An excellent discussion of these proposals is contained
in Huston, Human Rights Enforcement Issues Of The United Nations Conference On Interna-
tional Organization, 53 IOWA L. REV. 272 (1967).
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cisco Conference, when the bill might have been adopted on a wave
of enthusiasm, was lost."6
Despite the Charter's two "obvious weaknesses," its recogni-
tion of human rights is of great historical moment:
The Charter of the United Nations presents a radical departure
from previous approaches to the international protection of
human rights. For some 3,000 years the concern of the interna-
tional community was restricted to the treatment of foreigners,
and various procedures were devised for dealing with claims of a
citizen of one country against another country for wrongs suf-
fered in the territory of the second country, or due to violations
of international law by its officials, citizens or inhabitants. Only
a hundred years ago, the international community expressed its
interest in the fate of minorities in limited areas of Europe, and
in the fate of people inhabiting certain parts of Africa.
6 1
60. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 47.
61. Sohn, The Human Rights Law Of The Charter, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 129 (1977). H.
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 159, argues that the Charter effects "a far-reaching change in
the position of the individual in international law" by recognizing in "an international treaty
of wide generality" the "rights of the individual as such." Given the ambiguous status of
most international human rights instruments, the legal effect of the Charter, despite its weak-
nesses in drafting, is a question of some importance. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF UNITED
NATIONS 29 (1950) argues that "the Charter does not impose upon the members a strict
obligation to grant to their subjects the rights and freedoms mentioned in the Preamble or in
the text of the Charter." The Charter's language, rather than being couched in precise legal-
istic terms, is characterized by a "lack of definiteness and definition" and by "hortatory
phrases." Henkin, The United Nations and Human Rights, 19 INT'L ORG. 504, 510 (1965).
M. MOSKOWlTz, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER 31, 32 (1959) suggests that the Char-
ter is not in itself a source of legal obligations in reference to human rights. Moskowitz bases
his arguments on the fact that U.N. intervention to enforce human rights is limited to action
taken to meet a "threat to the peace" or a "breach of the peace" under Chapter VII. Other-
wise, U.N. action in support of human rights is limited to "promotion and encouragement of
human rights." In effect, Moskowitz concludes that there is, "no power other than that of
international public opinion or example which can require a Member State to adopt any
particular program for the promotion of human rights." In contrast, Sohn, id at 131-32,
contends that "The Charter is the cornerstone of international Jus cogens, and its provisions
prevail over all other international and domestic legislative acts. Should a state conclude a
treaty or issue a legislative act or regulation which constitutes a gross violation of human
rights, such a treaty or act would be clearly invalid as contrary to a basic and overriding
norm of the Charter, and any Tribunal, international or domestic, which might be asked to
apply such a treaty, act or regulation, should refuse to do so." H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note
5, at 145-47 agrees with Moskowitz that the U.N. Charter fails to provide machinery to
implement the Charter's human rights clauses, but still maintains that the Charter imposes
legally binding obligations.
In so far as such protection signifies the safeguarding of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms through a legally authorised and effective machinery of compul-
sion, it would seem that the authors of the Charter rejected the idea of a guarantee
thus conceived.
He observes that the proposal that the Charter should ensure not only the "promotion," but
also the "protection" of human rights and fundamental freedoms was rejected on the
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B. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
United Nations organs took preliminary steps toward the
drafting of a "bill of rights" prior to the ratification of the United
Nations Charter. The Preparatory Commission of the United Na-
tions,6 and its Executive Committee,63 recommended that the work
of the Commission on Human Rights should be directed to the for-
mulation of an international bill of rights. In its first session the
General Assembly concurred in the Executive Committee's recom-
mendation of Resolution 7(1). The General Assembly's directive
was then incorporated by the Economic and Social Council into the
terms of reference of the Commission on Human Rights.64
grounds that it "might be interpreted as giving the United Nations the right to impose ac-
tively upon the Members the observance of human rights and freedoms... " After review-
ing the Charter provisions, Lauterpacht observes that the restraint exhibited by these
provisions,
Studiously falling short of conferment of direct executive authority, is impressive in
its consistency. This caution is made more conspicuous by the choice of the agen-
cies entrusted with the implementation, such as it is, of the provisions of the Char-
ter. These agencies are the General Assembly and the Economic and Social
Council. By the terms of the Charter both these organs are deprived of executive
and legislative powers of binding decision. The only organ of the United Nations
which is endowed with that power to a high degree, namely, the Security Council
has no ordinary jurisdiction in the matter of human rights ....
Despite these "loose protections," H. LAUTERPACHT, Id at 148, argues that the "cumulative
legal result of all these pronouncements cannot be ignored." The fact that there is no defini-
tion or implementation of human rights is not controlling, "[for] the Charter fails to provide
for the enforcement of its other numerous obligations the legal character of which is un-
doubted." The fact that human rights are not defined, results in a "diminished effectiveness"
for the U.N. Charter rather than the protections being "destroyed," id at 148-49. Lauter-
pacht goes on to support his argument by reference to the mandatory language of the human
rights provisions in the Charter.
There is a mandatory obligation implied in the provision of Article 55 that the
United Nations shall promote respect for, and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms; or, in the terms of Article 13, that the Assembly shall make
recommendations for the purpose of assisting in the realisation of human rights and
freedoms. There is a distinct element of legal duty in the undertaking expressed in
Article 56 in which 'all members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55.'
Id at 148. A legal obligation placed upon the United Nations:
is an inescapable princple of interpretation that whenever an international instru-
ment defines in its constitution, the purposes of its being, the right and obligation to
give effect to those purposes are inherent in it and nothing short of an express dero-
gation from that implicit authority can legitimately restrict the powers and obliga-
tions in question.
Id at 159.
62. Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations (PC/20) Chap. III,
Section 4, paras. 15-16.
63. Executive Committee Report on Committees and Commissions of the Economic
and Social Council (PC/EX/95, section B, para. 21, p. 18).
64. G.A. Res. 7(I), January 29, 1946; ECOSOC Res. 5(I) of February 16, 1946.
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At its first meeting on January 27, 1947, the Human Rights
Commission undertook the preparation of a bill of rights as its
principal task.65 The first draft was to be prepared by the Commis-
sion's Bureau, consisting of its chairman (Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt,
United States), the Vice-Chairman and the rapporteur. The Bu-
reau used drafts prepared by the Director of the Division of
Human Rights and by Great Britain as the basis of its discussion.
66
The draft was submitted to the General Assembly on September 21,
1948.67
The General Assembly referred the draft to its Third Commit-
tee, which devoted eighty-one meetings to a discussion of the text.
The Committee proposed one hundred sixty-eight formal amend-
ments and "the text which finally emerged was surprisingly like the
one that had been prepared by the Commission on Human
Rights. '' 68 The General Assembly acted quickly, and after adopt-
ing a United Kingdom amendment to Article 2, unanimously ac-
cepted the Declaration as resolution 217A( 111) on the night of
December 10, 1948.69 The document was proclaimed by the
65. The Commission was charged with submitting proposals, recommendations and re-
ports to the Council concerning: (a) an international bill of rights; (b) international declara-
tions or conventions on Civil Liberties, the States of Women, Freedom of Information, and
similar matters; (c) the protection of minorities; (d) the prevention of discrimination on
grounds of race, sex, language or religion.
66. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 274; Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at
48.
67. The Soviet Union attacked the drafting committee as "unrepresentative" and Mrs.
Roosevelt reconstituted the Committee to include Australia, Chile, China, the United States,
France, Lebanon, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed.,
supra note 5, at 48. Initially the Commission was unable to produce a draft owing to differ-
ences of opinion over whether the bill of rights ought to be a non-binding declaration of
principles or a binding international instrument. This disagreement was solved by initially
adopting a declaration which would be non-binding, see Report of the drafting Committee
Doc. E/CN.4/21. The Drafting Committee report was considered by the Commission in
December 1947. The Commission decided to prepare both a non-binding declaration and a
binding Covenant. In addition, a Working Group on Implementation was established in
order to study methods of giving effect to international human rights guarantees, the Com-
mission provisionally adopted drafts of a declaration and a Covenant for submission to the
Economic and Social Council while the report of the Working Group was reserved for fur-
ther study. The draft articles for an international declaration of human rights and for an
international covenant on human rights and the report of the Working Group of Implemen-
tation are contained in Doc. E/800 and in Economic and Social Council, Official Records,
Third Year, Sixth Session, Supp. No. 1 (1948). The Economic and Social Council did not
have time to examine either the Draft Declaration or the Covenant, but decided to submit
the Draft Declaration in the next session of the General Assembly in Paris. H. LAUTER-
PACHT, supra note 5, at 276.
68. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 48.
69. Res. 217(1 11) in General Assembly, 3rd Session, Official Records Pt. I, Resolutions,
p. 71; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 127 (1949).
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General Assembly7"
as a common standard of achievement for all people and all Na-
tions, to the end that every individual and every organ of society,
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and
freedoms and by progressive measures, national and interna-
tional, to secure their universal and effective recognition and ob-
servance, both among the peoples of member states and among
the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states, inter alia, that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." The
Preamble adds that, "Member States have, in joining the United
Nations pledged themselves to achieve in cooperation with the
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and obser-
vance of human rights and fundamental freedoms."'" "[lIt is essen-
tial, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort,
to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law."72 Finally, the Preamble
concludes that a "common understanding of these rights and free-
doms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this
pledge."73
The "rights" enumerated in the Declaration which belong to
"everyone," or to "all human beings" or to "men and women of full
age" have been called "most comprehensive."74
They include, among many items, not only provision for equality
of treatment with respect to all rights and freedoms set forth in
the Declaration, 'without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status,' and the
traditional personal liberties such as freedom and security of per-
son, right to a fair trial, and freedom of thought, expression,
opinion, religion, assembly, association and movement, but also
The vote was 48 in favor, 0 votes against, eight abstentions and 2 were absent. One of the
absent countries subsequently informed the Secretary-General that if its representative had
not been prevented from attending the meeting, the delegate would have voted for the Decla-
ration. Doc. A/1311 of 7 August 1950. The dissenting votes came from the Soviet Union,
five Eastern, Communist bloc countries, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
70. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, id.
7 1. Id. at Preamble.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. McDougal and Bebr, supra note 48, at 614.
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certain more recently emerging political, economic and social
claims, such as those to nationality and freedom to change na-
tionality, to asylum from persecution, to take part in government
and to have equal access to public service, to social security and
choice of employment, and to education, leisure, participation in
cultural life, and an adequate standard of living.
75
The enthusiastic reaction to passage of the Declaration was
typified by the reaction of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt who saw the
document as embodying a world standard of individual human
rights. "It might well become the Magna Carta of all man-
kind. . . . [I]t has importance comparable to the 1879 proclama-
tion of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the Declaration of
Independence, and similar declarations made in other countries.
76
Other commentators familiar with the political divisions in the
United Nations viewed the swift passage of the Declaration as a
remarkable achievement. "[Tihe adoption of the Declaration was
probably the major achievement of the United Nations."
In less than two years, the organization had been able to agree
on the adoption of a text in a matter which was not only rife with
difficulties but which went to the very heart of the ideological
conflict which had bedevilled the United Nations ever since San
Francisco and is still largely responsible for preventing the or-
ganization from carrying out the major functions with which it is
charged by the Charter.77
Although the Universal Declaration is formally a non-binding
Declaration, it has served as the foundation for United Nations
human rights activities. 78 The provisions of the Declaration have
served as a basis for various actions taken by the United Nations.
The Declaration has inspired a number of international conven-
tions both within and without the United Nations; exercised a sig-
nificant influence on national constitutions and municipal
legislation and, in several cases, has been influential in court deci-
sions. The text of the provisions of the Declaration have been used
75. Id
76. General Assembly Official Records, 3rd Session, Pt. 1 (1948) at 262. Morris B.
Abram, New York Times, May 25, 1969 § 6 (Magazine), at 117; and Pierre Juvigny of the
French Conseil d'E TAT, U.N. Secretariat, International Year for Human Rights. Newslet-
ter No. 8, Supp. No. 1, at 18 (1966), both point out that the Universal Declaration is unique
in having combined both civil, economic and social rights in the same instrument.
77. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 49, citing L.M. GOODRICH, THE
UNITED NATIONS 324 (1959). The swift passage may have been due to the Declarations non-
binding character.
78. Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 51.
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in international instruments of national legislation.7 9 There are
also many instances of the use of the Declaration as a code of con-
duct or yardstick to measure the degree of respect for and compli-
ance with the international standards of human rights."0
The Declaration itself has an ambiguous legal status. Ezeji-
ofor points out that a "declaration" is not a formally binding in-
strument, and that states voting for the Universal Declaration made
it clear that they did not intend to be legally bound by the Declara-
tion.' Lauterpacht, after analyzing the General Assembly debate,
concluded that
[tihey did so, to a large extent, in order to draw attention to the
necessity of the Declaration being followed by a legally binding
instrument-a Covenant-provided with means of international
supervision and enforcement .... 82
It was only occasionally and by way of rare exception that a
delegation showed some lack of appreciation of the fact that the
Declaration was not intended to be legally binding. 3
79. United Nations and Human Rights, supra note 3, at 9.
80. Id. For a comprehensive survey of human rights efforts inspired by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights see id at 11-15, 25-29.
81. G. EzEJIOFOR, supra note 7, at 59. The U.N. Office of Legal Affairs has clarified the
Legal Status of a "declaration."
In the United Nations practice, a 'declaration' is a formal and solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are be-
ing enunciated, such as the Declaration on Human Rights. A recommendation is
less formal.
A 'declaration' or a 'recommendation' is adopted by a resolution of a United Na-
tions Organ. As such it cannot be made binding upon Member States, in the sense
that a treaty or convention is binding upon the parties to it, purely by the device of
terming it a 'declaration' rather than a 'recommendation.' However, in view of the
greater solemnity and significance of a 'declaration,' it may be considered to impart,
on behalf of the organ adopting it, a strong expectation that Members of the inter-
national communty will abide by it. Consequently, in so far as the expectation is
gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recog-
nized as laying down rules binding upon States.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.610 (1962). J. CAREY, supra note 5, at 9, seems to adopt this analysis
in arguing that the Universal Declaration has a "quasi-legal" status. U. Thant referred to the
Declaration as "norm-setting." [d
82. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 5, at 400. A full discussion of the question of the legal
status Declarations is contained in id at 397-408.
83. Id at 404. This view was limited to France, China and Belgium. The remarks of
Mrs. Roosevelt are often quoted in support of the position that the Declaration has no legal
status:
It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport
to be a statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles
of human rights and freedoms. . . to serve as a common standard of achievement
for all peoples of all nations.
19 DEPT. STATE BULL. 751 (1948). For the statement of other representatives, See The United
Nations and Human Rights: Eighteenth Report of the Commission to Study the Organization
for Peace (1968). Humphrey, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 50, points out that the General
Assembly had given the Commission a mandate to draft a convention covering the same
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Conversely, Sohn argues that the Universal Declaration is
"part of the constitutional law of the world community and . ..
has achieved the character of a world law superior to all other in-
ternational instruments and to domestic laws." 4 Sohn's view is
bolstered by the 1968 Teheran Conference which unanimously pro-
claimed that the Declaration "states a common understanding of
the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable
rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obli-
gation for the members of the international community." 5
Additional arguments favoring the legally binding status of the
Declaration are contained in the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 86 and in the Dec-
laration on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination,87 which
were both unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. These
declarations provide that all states shall "observe faithfully and
strictly the provisions of. . .the Universal Declaration of Human
rights covered in the declaration. Thus, if the declaration was intended to be binding, the
Covenant would be duplicative and serve no purpose.
84. Sohn, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMP. JUR. 17, 26
(1967). See also E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
(1964).
85. Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.32/4 1, at 4, para. 2 (1968), See also Statement of the Unofficial Montreal Assembly for
Human Rights which states that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order, and has over the years be-
come a part of customary law." See J. CAREY, supra note 5, at 13-14 nn. 18-19.
See also Statement of the United Nations Secretary-General in the Proclamation of the
Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights at Teheran, U.N. Doc. A/720/
Add. I (1968), at 13, ". . . the declaration not only constitutes an authoritative interpretation
of the Charter obligations but also a binding instrument in its own right, representing the
consensus of the international community on the human rights which each of its members
must respect, promote and observe." Compare these statements with a resolution adopted
unanimously by a Working Session of the World Peace Through Law Centre at Geneva in
September 1968. See World Peace Through Law Centre, "The International Observance,
World Law Day Human Rights 1968," Pamphlet Series No. 12, at 34 (1969). The session,
"resolved to note that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is in fact not part of the
International Law of Nations in spite of its ratification by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, and to reaffirm that all nations should consider the Declaration as a legal
guide and that they have a moral responsibility to recognize its provisions, be they personal,
political, economic or social, and to implement them, where appropriate, by just national
legislation or administrative measures." Brierly attempts an interesting compromise between
these two positions. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 293 (6th ed. 1963). Brierly argues
that the Charter only contains a "pious injunction to co-operate in promoting respect of
human rights .. " But a "pledge to cooperate... implies a negative obligation not so to
act as to undermine human rights .... " Thus, the Charter, in Brierly's view, imposes a
negative duty on states.
86. G.A. RES. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (16) 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4694 (1960).
87. THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. OPI/621 (1978) 87.
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Rights . .. ""8 Additional evidence supporting the legally binding
nature of the Declaration can be found in Economic and Social
Council Resolution 1503, which confers upon a Subcommission the
authority to consider petitions which "appear to reveal a consistent
pattern of gross and reliably attested to violations of human rights
and fundamental freedoms." Under the interpretation given to
Resolution 1503, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
considered one of several authoritative statements of human rights,
the violation of which provides a basis for complaints.8 9
C. The Civil and Political Covenant
The General Assembly determined that the international "Bill
of Rights" should consist not only of a Declaration, but also of a
covenant and measures of implementation.90 The General Assem-
bly subsequently decided that there should be two covenants---one
covering civil and political rights, and the other covering economic
and social rights-and that the measures of implementation should
be contained in the covenants.91 However, in 1966 it was decided
88. See note 86, supra; G.A. REs. 1904 (XVIII), Art. 2, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (15) 35-
37, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
89. ECOSOC RES. 1503 (XLVIII) May 27, 1970. Guggenheim, Key Provisions of the
New United Nations Rules Dealing With Human Rights Petitions, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 427, 435 (1973). Further discussion of the Declaration are contained in N. ROBINSON,
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN, SIGNIFICANCE, APPLICA-
TION AND INTERPRETATION (1958); E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY: THE ROOTS AND GROWTH OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1948-1963 (1965); L.B. Sohn, .4 Short History of United Nations Documents on
Human Rights, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations and
Human Rights (18th report of the Commission, 1968); S. RABANBELN, A MUSLIM COMMEN-
TARY ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1970); Verdoot, The Present
Signicance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 7 WORLD JUSTICE 158-69 (1965).
90. Report of the Commission on Human Rights, Second Session, Economic and Social
Council Office Records Supplement No. I (E/600), para. 18, December 2 to 17, 1947; G.A.
RESOLUTIONS 217F (III), December 10, 1948; 421E (V), December 4, 1950; 543 (VI), Febru-
ary 5, 1952. Initially it was thought that only civil and political rights should be protected,
but the majority of the General Assembly declared at its fifth session, in 1950, that the enjoy-
ment of civil and political freedoms and economic, social and cultural rights "are intercon-
nected and interdependent" and instructed the Commission on Human Rights to include in
the Draft Covenant, "a clear expression of economic, social and cultural rights in a manner
which relates them to the civil and political freedoms proclaimed by the draft covenant."
G.A. RES. 421E (V), December 4, 1950. In 1952 the General Assembly decided that two
covenants should be drafted, simultaneously approved, and opened for signature. G.A. REs.
543 (VI), February 5, 1952. It should be noted that the preamble of each of the covenants
recognizes that the "ideal of free human beings ... can only be achieved if conditions are
created whereby everyone may enjoy the economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his
civil and political rights."
91. Schwelb, Some,4spects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of December
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that an individual's right to petition should be included in a sepa-
rate Optional Protocol attached to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
The Human Rights Commission devoted six sessions between
1949 and 1954 to preparing the draft covenants. 92 In 1954 the draft
covenants were submitted to the General Assembly, which subse-
quently devoted twelve years to an article by article consideration
of the draft covenant.93 On December 16, 1966, eight years after
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,94 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional
Protocol, and the International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights were adopted and opened for signature, ratification
and accession. 95
Sohn evaluated the significance of the fifty-three articles of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
For the first time, the international community reached an agree-
ment not only on the list of basic human rights, but also on the
content of each right and on the most important limitations to
such rights. . . . [they are] more precise, providing detailed
guidelines for the conduct of governments, specific legal protec-
tions for individuals, and an enumeration of instances in which
public safety, order health, morals, etc. can be invoked to limit
individual freedoms. Secondly, the Covenants contain various
measures of implementation; though some of them are optional
1966, in A. Eide and A. Schou eds., supra note 5, at 103. Although suggestions were made to
reconsider the decision to have one covenant, the subject was not reopened formally since a
great deal of delay would have resulted. See Schwelb, id at 106 citing U.N. Doc. A/C.33/
SR.1396 (October 17, 1966) (Sudan). See also Starr, International Protection of Human
Rights and the United Nations Covenants, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 863, 864 n.4. Schwelb, supra at
106 states that the decision "for two instruments can be explained by the ... fundamental
different character of the rights concerned."
92. Starr, supra note 91, at 864 n.4.
93. Id
94. G.A. RES. 217, (III), December 10, 1948.
95. U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1496, Provisional. The voting was unanimously in favor of both
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (105-0) and of the Civil
and Political Covenant (106-0) with a majority in favor of the optional protocol (66 in favor,
0 opposed and 38 abstentions). Australia signed the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights
on December 18, 1972; the United States signed the Covenant on October 5, 1977. Neither
country has taken the legislative action required to ratify the Covenant. Schwelb, supra note
91, at 123, remarks that the impetus gained from passage of the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was responsible for passage of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Useful discussions of the Covenants can be found
in M. GANJI, supra note 5; T. GREEN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 37-67
(1956); E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1964);
MacChesney, International Protection of Human Rights in the United Nations, 47 Nw. U.L.
REV. 198 (1952); Starr, supra note 91, at 864.
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in character, they recognize the right of individuals to seek re-
dress of their grievance on the international plane. . . . [it is an]
authoritative interpretation of the basic rules of international law
on the subject of human rights which are embodied in the Char-
ter. ... 96
The States legal obligations under the Covenant are set forth
in Article 2(1) whereby each party to the Covenant undertakes to
"respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Cove-
nant without distinction of any kind. . . ." Under Article 2(2)
each Party "undertakes to take the necessary steps . . . to give ef-
fect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant" where a right
is not already protected by existing legislation.
The rights recognized in the Covenant include:
[A] right to life; prohibitions on torture and slavery; liberty and
security of the person including protection from arbitrary arrest
or detention; humane treatment of persons in prison; liberty of
movement and . . . freedom to leave any country, including
one's own and a right to enter one's own country; equality before
the law; fair and public trials with various guarantees, such as
right to counsel, a privilege against self-incrimination. . . and a
prohibition against ex post facto laws; freedom of religion; free-
dom of expression; a right of peaceful assembly; and freedom of
association. 97
1. Limitations. Robertson makes two general observations
concerning the rights afforded individuals under the Covenant.9s
First, the "definitions given are frequently more liberal or progres-
sive" than in other comparable instruments.99 Further, the rights
96. Sohn, supra note 43, at 135. Sohn comments that since the Covenant was adopted
unanimously by 105 votes to 0 and the Universal Declaration by 50 votes to 0, that the
Covenant "is even more universal in their origin than the declaration." Id at 136.
97. Starr, supra note 91, at 867. Robertson lists rights which are in the Covenant which
do not appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: the right of detained persons
to be treated with humanity; freedom from imprisonment for debt; prohibition of propa-
ganda for war and of incitment to hatred; the rights of the child; and the rights of minorities.
The right to property is contained in the Universal Declaration but excluded from the Cove-
nant On Civil and Political Rights, A. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 37.
98. Id.
99. Id See article on the right to life "which, although not prohibiting the death pen-
alty," clearly is "drafted with the intention of indicating that it should be abolished." Article
10 provides that all detained persons, "shall be treated humanely and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person"; separate facilities are to be provided for juveniles
and adult offenders; and that the "essential aim" of the penitentiary system shall be the
"reformation and social rehabilitation of prisoners." Article 14 guarantees defendants cer-
tain rights at trial - an independent, impartial tribunal, a public hearing, presumption of
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enumerated in the Covenant are "so general or imprecise that the
texts appear to be more statements of political principle or policy
than of legally enforceable rights.""Io The drafting tends to be so
broad as to be either unrealistic, unenforceable or providing deci-
sion-makers with almost unlimited discretion. Examples of such
broad statements include Article 10(3) establishing "reformation
and social rehabilitation" as "essential aims" of the penitentiary
system; Article 16 requiring the "right to recognition everywhere as
a person before the law;" the prohibition in Article 20 of "propa-
ganda for war;" and Article 25(a) guaranteeing everyone the right
to take part in the "conduct of public affairs."' 0 '
Another problem presented by the drafting of the rights in the
Covenant involves the subjucation of certain rights to those restric-
tions which are proscribed by law. Included are those items neces-
sary to protect public safety, order, health, morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others, 0 2 or those which are
necessary for national security in a democratic society.' 0 3 These
limiting clauses have potentially far-reaching limitations on human
rights protection under the Covenant. For example, Schwelb dis-
cusses the possible limitations of rights by the application of the
"public order" exception. "The delegations responsible for this
formula were not willing to admit to their public that freedom of
the press, of assembly and association are limited by whatever pub-
lic policy prevails in a State Party and one chose therefore the pre-
sumably less embarrassing French term." 1° Schwelb goes on to
argue that the "public order" limitation implies that if, for example,
South Africa became a State Party to the Covenant, such rights as
freedom of the press, assembly and association could all be limited
by the requirements of South Africa's apartheid policy;'0 5 its ordre
public.
Another limitation on the scope of the rights contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is found in
Article 4. Article 4 authorizes States to take measures derogating
innocence and protection against self-incrimination, right of appeal, compensation for a mis-
carriage of justice, and the principle of ne bis in idem.
100. Id at 38.
101. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights U.N. OPI/562 (1976). [herein-
after cited as Civil and Political Covenant].
102. Id. Part II, art. 18(3) (right of thought conscience, and religion).
103. See id art. 21 (right of assembly), art. 12 (right of internal movement), art. 22(2)
(right to form and join unions), art. 19(3)(a)(b) (right of expression).
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from their obligations under the Covenant in time of "public emer-
gency which threatens the life of the Nations, the existence of which
is officially proclaimed." State Parties will be allowed to vary from
the protections of Article 4 only under a series of narrow conditions
and limitations."o
A further limitation on the scope of human rights protections
in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is found in Article 5.
Article 5 stipulates that "[njothing in the the present Covenant may
be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right
to engage in any activity aimed at the destruction of any of the
106. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 4(l)(2)(3). See also Publica-
tions of the European Court of Human Rights, Series B. Lawless Case (hearing of April 8,
1961); for ruling of the European Court, Lawless Case (Merits), Judgment of July I, 1961,
para. 22, reprinted in [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS No. 4, 438, at 472 (Eur.
Comm. of Human Rights). Both the European Commission and Court of Human Rights
take the position that it was their task to determine whether the conditions for exercise of a
similar right of derogation had been fulfilled and whether the exceptional measures did not
exceed the extent strictly required by the situation.
The narrow conditions and limitations to which derogation under Article 4 is subject to
include:
(a) the public emergency must threaten the life of the nations;
(b) its existence must be officially proclaimed;
(c) the emergency measures must not go beyond what is strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation;
(d) the emergency measures must not be inconsistent with the State Party's other
obligations under international law;
(e) they must not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, color, sex,
language, religion, or social origin;
(f) no derogation is permitted from the protections of Article 6 (right to life), Arti-
cle 7 (freedom from torture), Article 8(l)(2) (freedom from slavery), Article I I (pro-
hibition of imprisonment for debt), Article 15 (prohibition of conviction for an act
which was not a crime when it was committed), Article 16 (recognition as a person
before the law) and from Article 18 (freedom of religion);
(g) and a State availing itself of the right of derogation shall immediately inform
the other States Parties of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the
reasons 'by which it was actuated.'
The European Convention under Article 15 permits derogation from obligations under
the European Convention in time of "war" as well as in time of "other public emergency."
No derogation is permitted from Article 2 (right to life); Article 3 (right to be free from
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment); Article 4(1) (right to be free from
slavery); and Article 7 (right to be free from punishment for an act which was not a crime at
the time the act was committed).
The American Convention on Human Rights, Article 27, permits derogation from the
rights protected in the Convention in "time of war, public danger, or other emergency that
threatens the independence or security of a State Party." Under Article 27(2) no derogation
is permitted from Article 17 (rights of the family); Article 18 (right to a name); Article 19
(rights of the child); Article 20 (right to a nationality); Article 23 (right to participate in
government).
Article 27(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights requires that State Parties
not only must inform other States Parties of derogation of rights in the Convention in "time
of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a
State Party," but that such State Parties must set a date for "termination of such suspension."
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rights and freedoms recognized herein." A broad interpretation of
this clause might be used to justify a restraint of individuals en-
gaged in "any activity" allegedly aimed at "the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms" recognized in the Covenant. This pro-
vision might be misused to limit the otherwise lawful activity of
individuals or groups perceived by a government as being unduly
critical of government policies or as creating social unrest. °7
Another major limitation on the scope of human rights protec-
tion in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
Article 2(1) under which "[e]ach State Party. . .undertakes to re-
spect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to itsjurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenent." In
contrast, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights
obligates State Parties to secure rights to "everyone within their ju-
risdiction," and Article 1 of the American Covention on Human
Rights obligates States to ensure rights to all persons "subject to
their jurisdiction."
Arguably the limiting language "within its jurisdiction" in Ar-
ticle 2(1) of the Covenant may be interpreted so as to relieve State
Parties of responsibility for human rights violations perpetrated
against individuals outside their territory. 10 8 The concept of "state
action" should not only be applied extraterritorially, but arguably,
should also be broadened to impose liability on States Parties for
human rights violations perpetrated by corporations chartered by
States Parties but operating outside the jurisdiction, and activities
of quasi-governmental vigilante-type groups operating outside the
States' borders.'°9
107. The language of Article 17 of the European Convention is identical to that of Arti-
cle 5 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 17 was the basis for the European
Commission of Human Rights rejection in July 1957 of an application by the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court of August 17, 1956, that had declared the Party illegal, dissolved it
and confiscated its assets. The Commission determined that the declared aims of the Party,
according to its own declarations, was to establish a Communist society by means of proleta-
rian revolution and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Commission found that
"dictatorship" would be inconsistent with rights under the Convention and that the activities
of the Party fell clearly within Article 17, Application 250/57, [19571 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON
HUMAN RIGHTS No. 1 222-225 (Eur. Comm. of Human Rights). Article 2a(a) of the Ameri-
can Convention of Human Rights does not permit any
. ..group or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and free-
doms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is
provided for herein.
108. This might arise in the context of State security agencies engaged in harassment of
the State's nationals living abroad.
109. For discussion of multi-national corporations, See United Nations, Multi-national
Corporations in World Development U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1974) and The Impact of
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In addition to problems involving the drafting of the rights and
the limitations on their scope, the Covenant may impose unrealisti-
cally strict legal obligations upon States Parties. Under Article 2(1)
"each State Party undertakes to ensure to all individuals . . the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction";
and, under Article 2(2), where such rights are not provided for by
existing laws, "each State Party . . .undertakes to take the neces-
sary steps . . . to give effect to the rights recognized in the present
Covenant."' l Schwelb argues that States Parties are under "the
obligation to maintain a defined standard.""' This obligation is
tempered by allowance for certain domestic limitations.
In contrast, Schwelb views the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic and Social Rights as a "promotional Covenant," setting
forth standards which States Parties pledge themselves to "secure
progressively."" 2 Under Article 2(1) of the International Covenant
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, each State Party under-
takes "to take steps individually and through international assist-
ance and cooperation. . . to the maximum of its available resources
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenent." 1
3
Thus, unlike the Civil and Political Covenant, the Social and
Economic Covenant makes allowances for socioeconomic and tech-
nological barriers which may prevent States Parties from immedi-
Multi-national Corporations on Development and on International Relations, Report of the
Group of Eminent Persons to Study the Impact of Multi-national Corporations on Develop-
ment and on International Relations U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. 1, ST/ESA/6 (1974).
110. State Parties to the European Convention, under Article 1, "shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms .. " The American convention under
Article 1 obligates State Parties to "undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized
herein and to ensure. . . the free and full exercise of the rights protected in the Convention."
I 11. Schwelb, supra note 91, at 108.
112. Id
113. Other limitations on State Party responsibility under the International Covenant on
Economic-Social and Cultural Rights include Article 4 which provides that
.. .State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law
only so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for
the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.
A further limitation on state responsibility is contained in Article 2(3) which provides that
developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy,
may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized
in the present Covenant to non-nationals.
Starr, supra note 91, at 869, remarks that this latter provision runs counter to the Charter
principle of sovereign equality of Member States, and it fails to take account of certain mini-
mum standards that international law imposes on States with respect to treatment of aliens.
Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile this provision with the spirit of universality
and nondiscrimination of the Universal Declaration, embodied in the preceeding
paragraph of the same Article of the Covenant.
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ately implementing the rights contained in the Covenant."'
Allowing States Parties to postpone or possibly avoid such "pro-
gressive implementation" of the Social and Economic Covenant,
seems more realistic than does the requirement of the Civil and
Political Covenant that States Parties maintain a "defined stan-
dard."" I 5 The qualifications'and difficulties involved in the draft-
114. Id.
115. At the same time, as of January 1978, only slightly more states had signed the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights than had signed the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Former Covenant had 46 signatories (23
ratifications) and the Civil and Political Covenant 44 signatories (24 ratifications). See Am-
nesty International, International Bill of Human Rights 50 (1978).
There are two additional problems with human rights guarantees in the Covenant and
two conceptual problems all of which should be mentioned. Under Article 50, the provisions
of the Covenant are extended to constituent units of federal States (e.g. United States, Aus-
tralia, Canada, India). This presents a problem since many of the human rights guarantees
in the Covenant are within the constitutional powers of constituent units of federal States
and implementation of such rights depends upon the initiative of the constituent units. See
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1411 (1966); Report of the Third Committee A/6546, paras. 129-36;
See also Proposed United States reservation to Article 14 "Message from the President of the
United States Transmitting The International Covenant On Civil and Political Rights" 95th
Congress 2nd Session, XIV, February 23, 1978. Secondly, according to Schwelb, supra note
91, at 113-14, the Commission on Human Rights was unable to agree on a clause on reserva-
tions. G.A. RES. 546 (VI), February 5, 1952. See Report of the Tenth Session of the Com-
mission on Human Rights E/2573 (1974). The absence of a provision on reservation will,
according to Schwelb, permit States to formulate reservations "not incompatible with the
object and purpose of the treaty." Schwelb, supra note 91, at 114.
Acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving
State a party to the treaty in relation to that State . . . If South Africa were to
decide to ratify the Covenants subject to the reservation that it does not accept
those of their provisions which prohibit discrimination and if one single other State
Party were to accept this reservation, South Africa would become a party to the
Covenants with all the prestige and Status this might imply.
Id As suggested, there are two conceptual difficulties involved in the Covenant. See supra
note 102, Part I, art. 1(1) (the same article appears in the Covenant On Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights) provides that, "all peoples have the right of self-determination by virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development."
See General Assembly Resolution 545 (VI), February 5, 1952, for drafting of final text,
GeneralAssembly Official Records, 10th Session (1955), Annexes, Report of the Third Com-
mittee A/3077, paras. 27-77. The Third Committee adopted the Article by 33 votes to 12
with 13 abstentions. Article 1(3) provides that "the States Parties, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall pro-
mote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right .. "
The inclusion of these two ambiguous, collective rights may be inappropriate in a Covenant
addressing individual human rights. Another conceptual problem involves Article 1(2) of
both the Civil and Political Covenant and the Economic and Social Covenant; and Article 47
of the Civil and Political Covenant and Article 25 of the Economic and Social Covenant.
Article 47 provides that, "nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing
the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources." This collective right also seems conceptually distinct from the individual rights
enumerated in the Covenant On Civil and Political Rights.
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ing of the Civil and Political Covenant raises the question of
whether the Covenant might more accurately be characterized as
providing for "human privileges" rather than for "human rights."
2. Implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. The draft provisions on implementation were prepared by
the Commission on Human Rights between 1947 and 1954.116 Be-
tween 1945 and 1966 the substantive provisions of the Covenant
were under consideration by the General Assembly." 7 As a result,
the main committee of the General Assembly, the Third Commit-
tee, was not in a position to address itself to the measures of imple-
mentation until its 18th session in 1963, at which time only a
general debate on the implementation provisions was conducted.
118
The 19th session of the General Assembly in 1964 was devoted
to a debate of Article 19 of the Charter, and at the 20th session in
1965, the General Assembly was involved in drafting and adopting
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. 119 Thus it was not until the 21st session in
116. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Tenth Session, 18 U.N. ESCOR,
Supp. (No. 7), U.N. Doc. E/2573 (1954). At the request of the General Assembly, G.A. RES.
833, 9 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 20, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954), the Secretariat prepared
the Annotations on the text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, 10 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 28, Part II) 1, 67 and 116, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955). Chap-
ters VII and IX of which deal with the draft measures of implementation. At a later stage,
again at the request of the General Assembly, G.A. RES. 1843B, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
17) 35 U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), the Secretary General prepared an additional Explanatory
paper on measures of implementation, 18 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes, Vol. 2 (Agenda Item 48),
U.N. Doc. A/541 1 (1963). Capotorti states that:
international measures of implementation is used to indicate, the collective legal
instruments through which the States parties to a multilateral agreement, or the
Organization which has promoted the stipulation of agreements among the Mem-
bers, try to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by each contracting
State.
The most widely used measures of international implementation are - periodic reports,
conciliation between States, and individual petition. Capotorti, The International Measures
of Implementation Included in the Covenants on Human Rights, in A. Eide and A. Schou eds.,
supra note 5, at 131.
117. Schwelb, supra note 91, at 104-05.
118. See Report of the Third Committee, 18 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 48)
14, 23-25, paras. 109-124, U.N. Doc. A/5655 (1963) and summary records of the 1267th to
1269th and 1273rd to 1275th meetings of the Third Committee, 18 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1267th
mtg.) 287, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1267 (1963); (1268th meeting) 293, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR.1268 (1963); (1269th meeting) 299, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1269 (1963); (1273rd meeting)
327 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1273 (1963); (1274th meeting) 333, U.N. Doc. A/C.S/SR.1274
(1963); (1275th meeting) 341, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1275 (1963); (1267th meeting) 347, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1276 (1963). See also G.A. RES. 1960, 18 U.N. GAOR, SupP. (No. 15) 42,
U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
119. Report of the Third Committee, 20 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 65) 10,
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1966 that the Third Committee initiated an article-by-article exam-
ination and drafting of the measures for implementation of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its
accompanying Optional Protocol. The General Assembly ap-
proved the Covenant and the measures of implementation, along
with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights at its 1496th meeting on December 16, 1966.12 °
The draft measures of implementation of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights were presented by the Commission on
Human Rights in 1955.121 The measures provided that if a State
Party believed that another State Party was not giving effect to a
provision of the Covenant, it could refer the matter to the Human
Rights Committee established under the Covenant. The Commit-
tee would then ascertain the facts, and make available its "good
offices," with a view toward reaching a friendly settlement of the
matter. If a solution was not reached, the Committee was to draw
up a report, stating whether in its opinion the facts disclosed a
breach of the state's obligations. The Human Rights Committee
was to be composed of nationals of States Parties to the Covenant.
They were to be elected by the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.), and were to serve in their "personal capacity."' 
22
The Commission's draft also provided that the I.C.J. might
render an advisory opinion on any legal question before the Com-
mittee. In cases where the Human Rights Committee failed to
reach a solution, recourse could be had to the I.C.J.1 23 and State
Party reports.' 24 Proposals to grant a right of petition to individu-
als and nongovernmental organizations, or to vest in the Commit-
tee the ex offcio power to consider interstate complaints of alleged
U.N. Doc. A/6173 (1965), and summary records of the 1370th and 1374th meetings of the
Third Committee, 20 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1370 (1965) and (1374th meeting) 503, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1374 (1965). See also G.A. REs. 2080, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14),
U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
120. See Report of the Third Committee, 21 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 62)
7, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966) and 21 U.N. GAOR (1496th Plen. Meeting) 1-14, U.N. Doc. A/
PV. 146 (1966). The implementation measures are discussed in, Buergenthal, Implementing
the U.N. Racial Convention, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 187 (1977). Capotorti, supra note 116;
Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights: The International Measures of Implementation, 62 AM. J.
INT'L L. 827 (1968); Schwelb, The International Measures of Implementation of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of the Optional Protocol, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J.
141 (1977).
121. Annotations, supra note 116, draft art. 40, at 81 and draft art. 43, at 89.
122. Id draft art. 27, at 68.
123. Id draft art. 44, at 91.
124. Id draft art. 48, at 95 and draft art. 49, at 100.
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human rights violations, were narrowly rejected at successive ses-
sions of the Commission on Human Rights.'25
The General Assembly debate on the proposed implementa-
tion provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights was characterized by an ideological split between the
Soviet Union and the United States.'26 The Soviet Union and
other Communist nations opposed permitting interstate complaints
on the grounds that it would unduly interfere in the domestic affairs
of the state against whom the complaint had been lodged, contrary
to Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter. 127 Consistent with
Socialist philosophy, the Communist nations also argued that the
implementation measures in the Civil and Political Covenant
should be "no stronger" than those in the Economic and Social
Covenant. 128  The Romanian representative, Mr. Glazer, com-
mented that "human rights could not be built upon the ruins of
national independence." 129 In rebuttal, the Western representatives




125. For a description of these attempts, see E. Schwelb, Notes on the Early Legislative
History of the Measures ofImplementation ofthe Covenant on Human Rights, in MELANGES
MODINOS (1968).
126. By the time the General Assembly examined the provisions on implementation of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, liberal implementation measures had been incor-
porated in the International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, G.A. RES. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14), 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014.
127. See the Statements in the meeting of the Third Committee by the U.S.S.R. (Mr.
Nasinovsky), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1397th meeting) 121-22, para. 48, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR. 1397 (1966) and id (1399th meeting) 127, paras. 22-24, U.N. Doc.A/C.3/SR.1399 (1966);
Ukraine S.S.R. (Mr. Kornyenko), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1415th meeting) 220, paras. 8-11,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1415 (1966); Bulgaria (Mr. Bahnev), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1416th
meeting) 226, paras. 7-11, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1416 (1966); Czechoslovakia (Mrs. Sekani-
nova-Cakrtova), id at 228, paras. 222-25, Romania (Mr. Glazer), id at 227, paras. 15-18,
Hungary (Mr. Beck), 21 U.N. GAOR C.3 (1417th meeting) 237, para. 37, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR 1417 (1966). The positions were the same in the general debate at the 18th Session of the
General Assembly.
128. In the early years of discussion on implementation measures the Soviet Union op-
posed reporting procedures as being an interference with the sovereignty of states. Statement
by the Soviet Delegation to the Commission on Human Rights, report of the Fifth Session, 9
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 10), Annex 111, 47-48, U.N. Doc. E/1371 (1949). See also Carey,
Implementing Human Rights Conventions The Soviet View, 53 KENTUCKY L. REV. 114 (1964).
129. Mr. Glazer (Romania), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1416th meeting) 227, para. 16, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1416 (1966).
130. See Lady Gaitskell (U.K.), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1415th meeting) 222, para. 25,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1415 (1966); Mr. MacDonald (Canada), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1387th
meeting) 62, para. 37, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1387 (1966); Mr. Mommersteeg (Netherlands),
21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1397th meeting) 119, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1397, id (1400th
meeting) 132, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1400 (1966).
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A compromise proposal termed an "original solution" was suc-
cessfully proposed by the Afro-Asian delegations.' 3 ' The proposal
attempted to provide strong implementation measures while also
recognizing that "new countries" lacked the legislative infrastruc-
ture to implement rights immediately. The following four stage im-
plementation process was viewed as necessary: 32 (a) the creation
of international machinery; (b) establishment of a reporting system;
(c) provisions for interstate complaints and conciliation machinery,
and (d) establishment of an international authority to receive and
act upon complaints by individuals against their own or other
states. The Indian delegate felt the "time was ripe" for the first two
stages. 133 This proposal was accepted, and became the basis for the
implementation machinery of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE
The Human Rights Committee is the principle organ involved
in implementing the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 134 Committee members are elected by the States Parties to
the Covenant 135 rather than by the I.C.J., as was originally pro-
vided in the Afro-Asian draft. Each State Party may nominate not
more than two of its own nationals to serve on the eighteen member
committee which is elected by secret ballot. ' 36 The Committee may
not include more than one national from each state. Nominees
must be "persons of high moral character and recognized compe-
tence in the field of human rights, consideration being given to the
usefulness of the participation of some persons having legal experi-
ence." 137 In the election, consideration shall be given to the equita-
ble geographic distribution of membership, to the representation of
"different forms of civilization and of the principle legal sys-
13 1. Two virtually identical drafts were proposed. India, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Senegal, Sudan, The United Arab Republic and Upper Volta sponsored U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
L. 1379 and Rev. 1 (1966); and U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L. 1373 (1966) was cosponsored by the same
delegations together with those Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tunisia. [The
documents will be hereinafter cited as the Afro-Asian Amendments].
132. Mr. Sanon (Upper Volta), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1418th meeting) 242, para. 12, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1418 (1966).
133. Mr. Sinha (India), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1416th meeting) 225, para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.1418 (1966).
134. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 28.
135. Id art. 29(1).
136. Id arts. 28(1), 29(1).
137. Id art. 28(2).
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tems." 138
Individuals "serve in their personal capacity,"' 39 and in order
to insulate them from political pressures, they serve a four year
term."4 Further, they receive "emoluments" from United Nations
resources rather than from their state of nationality. 4' The inde-
pendence of members of the Human Rights Committee, in the final
analysis, is limited by the fact that they must be nominated and
renominated by their State of nationality.
42
The draft Covenant contained a provision, modeled after
Article 31 of the Statute of the I.C.J., which provided that a State
Party involved in a case being heard by the Human Rights Com-
mittee may, if none of its nationals is a member of the Committee,
designate a person of its choice to participate and vote in the Com-
mittee deliberations. This provision was deleted at the 1951 session
of the Commission on Human Rights because such ex officio repre-
sentation was thought to interfere with the neutrality of the Com-
138. Id art. 31. The draft covenant spoke of persons having "judicial or legal experi-
ence." The reference to "judicial experience" was deleted by the Third Committee by a vote
of 86 in favor, 0 opposed and 3 abstentions, 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1420th meeting) 249, para.
11, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1420 (1966); Draft International Covenants on Human Rights,
Report of the Third Committee, 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (Agenda Item 62) 56, para. 194 and 58,
para. 207, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Draft International Covenants Re-
port]. The Commission on Human Rights draft also called for persons of "high moral stand-
ing" which was amended to read "high moral character." Draft International Covenants
Report, id at 56, para. 193 and at 58, para. 206. The Racial Discrimination Convention
Article 8(l), provides that experts of "high moral standing and acknowledged impartiality"
serve on the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination (Article 8). The American
Convention requires that the Inter-American Commission be composed of seven members of
"high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights" (Article 34).
139. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 28.
140. Id art. 32(1).
141. Id art. 35. In contrast, under Article 8(6) of the Racial Discrimination Convention,
State Parties are responsible for expenses of the members of the Committee. Expenses of the
European Commission on Human Rights are to be borne by the Council of Europe (Article
58). Article 72 provides that the O.A.S. will provide "emoluments and travel expenses" for
the members of the Inter-American Commission.
142. See id arts. 29(1) and (2). This is considered an advance over the convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which in Article 8(2) provides that a
State Party may nominate only one person from among its own nationals. The European
Convention in Article 21 (1) provides for election of the European Commission by the Com-
mittee of Ministers. Each State Party may put forward three candidates, two of whom shall
be its own nationals. The American Convention on Human Rights goes even further than
the European Convention in attempting to provide that an individual is not dependent for
nomination and election upon his/her state of nationality (Article 36(2)). Each government
may propose up to three candidates who may be nationals of any Member State of the Or-
ganization of American States. A slate of three must include at least a nominee who is a
national of another Member State.
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mittee. 14 3
Thus, some attempt was made to make the Human Rights
Committee independent of governmental control. Capotori com-
ments favourably on the composition of the Human Rights Com-
mittee.
A body composed of individuals independent from governments
is . . . exclusively bound to general interests: its members will
enjoy larger freedom of initiative and will be capable of assum-
ing a critical position, if they think it necessary, with greater ob-
jectiveness. For this reason the solution adopted in the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights seems to be far better .... 144
A. Functions of the Committee
The Human Rights Committee has five major functions:
(1) To study reports submitted by States Parties and to trans-
mit the reports, and such general comments as it may consider ap-
propriate, to the States Parties concerned. It may also transmit
these comments to the Economic and Social Council. All States
Parties to the Covenant are subject to these requirements.
45
(2) The Committee is empowered to consider interstate com-
munications and, communications from a State Party which con-
siders that another State Party is not giving effect to the provisions
of the Covenant. For this procedure to be utilized both States Par-
ties involved must recognize the competence of the Committee to
receive interstate communications. The Committee shall make
available its good offices to the State Parties concerned with a view
to a friendly solution to the matter.
(3) If a matter referred to the Committee in accordance with
Article 41 is not resolved to the satisfaction of the States Parties
concerned, the Committee may, with the prior consent of the States
143. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Seventh Session, 13 U.N. ESCOR
SuP. (No. 9) 17, para. 78, U.N. Doc. E/1992 (1951). An attempt to reinstate the provision
in 1953 was unsuccessful, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Ninth Session, 16
U.N. ESCOR, SuPP. (No. 8) 20-21, paras. 181-184 and Annex III, at 69, paras. 175-176, U.N.
Doc. E/2447 (1953). A provision for members adhoc appears in Article 8 of the 1962 Proto-
col to the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education (1962).
144. Capotorti, supra note 116, at 136. There is a related area where the neutrality of the
Committee is in question. The Civil and Political Covenant does not require that members
of the Committee be nationals of a state which has accepted the optional interstate communi-
cation procedures contained in Article 41 or the Optional Protocol's right of individual peti-
tion. Such committee members may be nationals of states having objections to such
procedures who will, on political and philosophical grounds, be reluctant to find any nation
"at fault."
145. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 40.
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Parties, appoint an ad hoc conciliation commission. The good of-
fices of the Commission shall be made available to the States Par-
ties concerned with a view to an amicable solution of the matter.
(4) The Committee is competent to receive and consider
communications from individuals who claim to be "victims" of a
violation by a State Party to the Optional Covenant of any of the
rights enumerated in the Covenant. The Committee shall forward
its views to the State Party and to the individual concerned.
(5) The Committee, pursuant to Article 45, shall submit to
the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council,
an annual report on its activities.
1. Reports. Article 40 provides for a mandatory reporting
system under which States Parties to the Covenant "undertake to
submit reports on the measures they have adopted" which "give
effect" to the rights recognized in the Covenant and "on the pro-
gress made in the enjoyment of those rights."' The first report is
to be submitted within one year after "entry into force" of the Cov-
enant and thereafter whenever "the Human Rights Committee so
requests." 147 Reports shall indicate the "factors and difficulties...
affecting" the implementation of the Covenant. 4 "
General guidelines for the content and form of States Parties'
reports were formulated at the second session of the Human Rights
Committee. 49 These guidelines are designed to ensure that reports
are presented in a uniform fashion to enable the Committee to ob-
tain a comprehensive picture of the implementation of human
rights in each state. The first part of the report should describe
briefly "the general legal framework within which civil and politi-
146. Id art. 40(i).
147. Id art. 40(l)(a)(b).
148. Id art. 40(2). The original Afro-Asian Amendments, supra note 131, at art. 39,
provided that the parties report on "the progress made in giving effect to the rights recog-
nized herein." This was modified in the existing language providing for reports to comment
on "progress made in the enjoyment of those rights." The original language might have been
interpreted to mean that the governmental action giving effect to the rights might have been
undertaken progressively. The final text restricts the "progressiveness" to the "enjoyment"
of the right, e.g. to the results of the governmental action without implying that governmen-
tal action might be undertaken progressively. For debate see Miss Hart (New Zealand), 21
U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1426th meeting) 282, para. 32, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1426 (1966); Miss
O'Leary (Ireland), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1427th meeting) 285, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR. 1427 (1966); Mrs. Ramaholimihaso (Madagascar), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1427th meeting)
289, paras. 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1427 (1966); Mr. Sanon (Upper Volta), id at 289,
para. 35; Mr. Mohammed (Nigeria), id at 289, para. 36.
149. Id.
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cal rights are protected" in a country. The second part should de-
scribe "the legislative, administrative or other measures in force in
regard to each right" and any "restrictions of limitations, even of a
temporary nature imposed by law or practice or in any other man-
ner, on the enjoyment of the right."' °
The report should also describe any other factors or difficulties
effecting the enjoyment of the right by persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the State, and provide any other information on the progress
made in the enjoyment of the right. The report should be accompa-
nied by copies of States Parties' principle legislative and other texts.
In addition, the Committee would welcome additional information
on any significant new developments in a country regarding the
rights referred to in the Covenant.'
5'
Reports are to be submitted to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations who shall transmit them to the Human Rights
Committee for consideration. 52 The Secretary-General may, after
consulting with the Committee, transmit copies of the reports to the
appropriate United Nations agencies. 153 The Human Rights Com-
mittee shall then study the reports submitted by the Parties and
shall transmit the reports and such "general comments as it may
consider appropriate" to the Parties concerned. The Committee
may also transmit these comments to the Economic and Social
Council along with copies of the reports it has received from States
Parties to the Covenant. 5 4 The States Parties concerned may also
submit to the Committee "observations on any comments that may
be made" by the Committee. 155
The reporting procedure appears to be a mechanism primarily
150. Id.
151. See Human Rights Committee Adopts Guidelines For States Reports, 14 U.N.
CHRONICLE 41 (August-September 1977); Committee Considers States' Reports, Complaints
From Individuals, 15 U.N. CHRONICLE 31 (March 1978).
152. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 49(2).
153. Id art. 40(3).
154. Id art. 40(4).
155. Id art. 40(5). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 115, at art. 19, provides for reports to be submitted to the Economic and
Social Council which may transmit them to the Commission on Human Rights for study and
"general recommendations." The Economic and Social Council may submit, "from time to
time," to the General Assembly reports with recommendations of a "general nature" and a
summary of the information received from the States Parties to the present Covenant (Article
21). Thus, the Economic and Social Council may go beyond "comments" and make "gen-
eral recommendations." Under the Covenant on Racial Discrimination, the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination may, after having considered reports by States
Parties make "suggestions and general recommendations based on the examination of the
reports and information received from the States Parties" (Article 9(2)).
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for gathering information on Human Rights. The effectiveness of
the reporting system depends upon whether States Parties submit
timely and accurate reports. However, states may be reluctant to
admit to or to recognize any inadequacies in their protection of
human rights.
Not only have governments been unwilling and unable to escape
the bias of their own perspectives, but the information they have
been furnishing can hardly be said to provide an expanding vi-
sion of reality. In the first place, there are fixed national habits
of thought that assign different values to the same fact or set of
facts. Secondly, the separate facts do not add up to make a
whole; if for no other reason than that they are rarely representa-
tive samples of the total situation they attempt to describe. The
irrelevancies contained in the reports are only exceeded by their
omissions. . . .Ten years of periodic reports have not given us a
settled vision of the world scene of human rights.
156
The Human Rights Committee has limited resources to devote
to examination of the reports and with which to evaluate the ade-
quacy of state compliance. Capotorti argues that examination of
reports is "deeper and more accurate when. . . discussed by one or
more technical organs before they are submitted to the political or-
gan entrusted with the power of addressing recommenda-
tions. .. ."I"5 Capotorti further argues that the availability of
sources of information other than state reports is a vital component
of "efficient control."
Since the Human Rights Committee is not empowered to go
outside the States' report in evaluating the effectiveness of the
States' human rights protection, the Committee is limited to mak-
156. Moskowitz, The Politics of Human Rights (1968), cited in R.S. CLARK, A UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1972). According to 14 U.N. Chroni-
cle, supra note 151, at 42, at the end of August 1977 only 17 of the 37 states "due to submit
their reports" had done so. At the end of March 1978, 18 of the states still had not submitted
reports. 15 U.N. CHRONICLE, supra note 151, at 31.
157. Capotorti, supra note 116, at 136-37. Capotorti looks approvingly at the Interna-
tional Labor Organization and European Social Charter:
[In the International Labor Organization. . .reports are examined by an expert
committee and are then summarised and transmitted to the relevant committee of
the General Conference with the observations of the experts. The latter Committee
discusses the conclusions of the first examination and finally submits its own de-
tailed report to the Conference in plenary meeting. It is for the Conference to
adopt this report and to formulate appropriate recommendations. The European
Social Charter establishes an even more complex procedure: reports are examined
by an expert Committee; the Committee's conclusions are transmitted both to the
Assembly of the Council of Europe, for its advice, and to a Sub-Committee of the
Social Committee of the Council of Europe. The Sub-Committee reports to the
Committee of Ministers and the latter may address its recommendations to the
States after further consultation with the Assembly.
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ing general comments to States Parties. These comments along
with responses by States Parties may then be transmitted to the Ec-
onomic and Social Council. No provision is made for the Commit-
tee to make specific recommendations to governments or to initiate
further action. The action which may be taken by the Economic
and Social Council is not set forth in the Covenant, but presumably
the Council may take any action it deems appropriate within its
powers under the Charter. Capotorti comments that the Commit-
tee's limited ability to act pursuant to States Parties reports is a
reflection of the general nature of the reports.
[A] specific recommendation presumes an accurate verification
of the circumstances. . . . Thus, wherever examination of re-
ports is superficial-as it unfortunately is in the Covenant sys-
tem-the only possible outcome consists in general
recommendations: and these have the function of means for po-
litical pressure, rather than of true instruments for supervising
the observance of the agreements.'
58
158. Id at 138. It should be noted that the reporting system complements an existing
procedure of the Commission on Human Rights instituted in 1956. ECOSOC RES. 624B
(XXXII) of August 1, 1956, E.S.C.O.R. 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/2929
(1956): presently governed by ECOSOC RES. 1074 (XXXIX) of July 28, 1965, E.S.C.O.R.
39th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 24-25 U.N. Doc. E/4117 (1965). Under the original 1956 Proce-
dures Member States and specialized agencies were asked to submit to the Secretary-General
a report every three years describing the developments and the progress achieved during the
preceding three years in the field of human rights, and measures taken to safeguard human
liberty in the States' metropolitan area and Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories. It
invited specialized agencies to transmit every three years a report in respect of rights coming
within their purview. The Secretary-General was requested to prepare and forward to Gov-
ernments suggestions which might serve as a guide for preparation of the reports by govern-
ments on a topical basis, and to prepare a brief summary of the reports for the Commission
on Human Rights, the first reports were to cover the years 1954-1956. State Members and
specialized agencies were invited to include a separate section on rights designated by the
Human Rights Committee. At the Thirty-ninth Session of the Economic and Social Council
in 1963 the system of reporting was revised and information was to be submitted within a
continuing three-year cycle; (a) in the first year on civil and political rights; (b) in the second
year on economic, social and cultural rights; and (c) in the third year on freedom of informa-
tion.
The Economic and Social Council on July 24, 1962 invited non-governmental organiza-
tions in consultative status to submit comments and observations of an objective character on
the situation in the field of human rights to assist the commission in consideration of the
summaries of periodic reports.
Sir Samuel Hoare, The U.N. Commission on Human Rights, in E. Luard ed., supra note
5, at 59, 86, remarks that in addition to the fact that the reports have not been submitted by
all U.N. Member States,
the reports are extremely uneven in presentation, content, and informativeness.
They are naturally, despite exhortations to Member States in Council resolutions,
to give information about difficulties encountered, more concerned with recounting
achievements than with recording inadequacy or failure. Nor have the conclusions
that it has been possible to draw from them so far been very enlightening. Some,
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B. Optional Interstate Complaints
An optional interstate complaint and conciliation procedure is
provided for under Articles 41 and 42. The optional interstate pro-
cedure is only applicable to States Parties to the Civil and Political
Covenant which declare that they "recognize the competence" of
the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communica-
tions from another State Party. All communications shall be in
writing, and no communication shall be received by the Committee
from or concerning a State Party which has not made such a decla-
ration.' 59
Under the optional interstate procedure, if a State Party to the
Covenant considers that another State Party "is not giving effect" to
the provisions of the Covenant, it may bring the matter to the atten-
tion of the State Party so charged by a written communication.
60
The State Party allegedly "not giving effect to the provisions of the
present Covenant" shall respond to the complaining State Party
with an "explanation or any other statement in writing clarifying
the matter" which "should," to the "extent possible and pertinent,"
include reference to "domestic procedures and remedies taken,
pending or available." 161 If the matter is not "adjusted to the satis-
faction of both States Parties" within six months of receipt of the
initial communication, "either State shall have the right to refer the
matter to the Human Rights Committee."'
' 62
The Human Rights Committee shall "deal" with the matter
referred to it in closed session, 63 only after having ascertained that
all domestic remedies "have been invoked and exhausted. '' "M The
States Parties concerned shall have the "right to be represented
when the matter is being considered" and shall have the "right to
make oral and written submissions." 165 The Committee is to con-
sider the matter with a view toward a "friendly solution" on the
but not many, non-governmental organizations have so far contributed comments
and observations.
159. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 41(1). The Convention on Racial
Discrimination provides for a mandatory interstate complaint and conciliation system under
Article 11.
160. "Not giving effect to the provisions of the present Covenant," presumably includes
violation of both substantive and procedural provisions (e.g. failure to submit a report).
161. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 41(a).
162. Id. art. 41(b).
163. Id. art. 41(d).
164. Id. art. 41(c).
165. Id. art. 41(g).
40
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1980], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss3/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
basis of "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."' 166
The Committee has twelve months after receipt of notice to
submit a report. 167 In the event a solution is reached, the Commit-
tee shall confine its report to a synopsis of the facts and the solu-
tion. If no solution is reached, the Committee shall confine its
report to a "brief statement of the facts." The written submissions
and the record of oral submissions made by the States Parties shall
be attached to the Committee's report.
68
1. Weaknesses. The State Party initiating the complaint does
not have to demonstrate any "harm" in order to bring the matter to
the attention of the "receiving" state or the Human Rights Commit-
166. Id. art. 41(e).
167. Id. art. 41(h).
168. Id art. 4(h)(ii). Under the American Convention of Human Rights, if a friendly
settlement has been reached, the Commission shall draw up a report which shall be transmit-
ted to the petitioner, to the States Parties to the Convention and also to the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Organization of American States for publication. The report shall "contain a brief
statement of the facts and of the solution reached." If any Party involved in the matter so
requests, the "fullest possible information shall be provided to it." If a settlement is not
reached, the Commission shall draw up a report "setting forth the facts and stating its con-
clusions." If within three months from the date of transmittal of the report to the States
Parties concerned, the matter has not been either settled or submitted by the Commission or
by the State concerned to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Commission may,
by majority vote, set forth "its opinion and conclusions" concerning "the questions submitted
for its consideration." Where "appropriate," the Commission shall make "pertinent recom-
mendations" and shall prescribe a period within which the State is to take the measures that
"are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation examined." When the prescribed period has
expired, the Commission shall decide by majority vote whether the State has taken adequate
measures and whether to publish its report.
See arts. 48, 49, 50, 51. These provisions which provide for a statement of "conclusions"
and "recommendations" are stronger than those in the Civil and Political Covenant. Under
the European Convention on Human Rights, if a "friendly settlement is reached between the
parties" a report shall be sent to the parties concerned, to the Committee of Ministers and to
the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe for publication. The Report shall be con-
fined to a "brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached." If a solution is not
reached the Commission shall draw up a Report on the facts and state its opinions as to
"whether the facts disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Con-
vention." The opinions of all members of the Commission on this point may be stated in the
Report and shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers who, if they do not refer the
matter to the European Court of Human Rights, ". . . shall decide by a majority of two-
thirds whether 'there has been a violation of the Convention."' If a violation has taken
place, the Committee may prescribe a period during which the Contracting Party must take
the measures required by the Commission. If the Contracting Party does not comply, the
Committee of Ministers shall decide "what effect shall be given to its original decision and
publish the report" (Articles 24, 25, 31). Under both the American and European Conven-
tions complaints may originate from any person, group of persons or Contracting State
Party. See American Convention arts. 44, 45; European Convention arts. 24, 25. However,
under the European Convention complaining persons and non-governmental organizations
must claim to be victims of a violation of one of the Contracting Parties.
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tee. The State Party's action is an actiopopularis; a remedy avail-
able to and on behalf of every member of the Community of
Nations. 16 9 The States Parties concerned also have the discretion to
determine, without reference to the interests of the Community of
Nations, whether the "matter" has been "adjusted to the satisfac-
tion of both States Parties." Both States shall have the discretion-
ary right to refer the matter to the Committee, and the discretion to
determine whether the "good offices" of the Human Rights Com-
mittee have resulted in a solution which respects human rights and
fundamental freedoms. In the event a solution is not reached,
States may consent to the matter being considered by an ad hoc
Conciliation Commission.
170
The Covenant is further weakened in that the implementation
procedures are designed to reconcile the parties rather than to reach
a decision on the merits. As a result, the Committee's procedures
are insulated from public view and pressure. The Committee holds
closed meetings when examining communications, and Article
41(7)(ii) provides that communication of the final report is to be
made only to the States Parties concerned and, presumably, to the
Economic and Social Council. 171 The Committee's limited role is
further illustrated by the fact that if a "friendly solution" which
respects human rights and fundamental freedoms is not reached,
the Committee must confine its report to a brief statement of the
facts and any written submissions by the States Parties concerned.
No provision is made for dissenting statements of the facts.172 If a
169. Judge Winiaski, Southwest Africa Cases [dissent], Southwest Africa Cases, [1962]
I.C.J. 449, 452 [preliminary objections].
170. See art. 42, discussed infra. An additional question concerns Article 41(c) which
requires exhaustion of domestic remedies, presumably by the individual whose rights alleg-
edly have been violated. It might be argued that an individual's exhaustion of domestic
remedies should not be a condition precedent to vindication of the interests of the Commu-
nity of Nations. Starr, supra note 91, at 880 n.82.
171. The American Convention on Human Rights provides in Article 49, that if a
"friendly settlement" has been reached, the Secretary-General of the OAS shall publish the
report. If a settlement has not been reached and the case has not been referred to the Inter-
American Court, the Commission has the discretion to publish its "opinion and conclusions"
in the event that the offending state has not taken the measures incumbent upon it to remedy
the situation (Articles 49, 51). The European Convention on Human Rights in Article 30
provides for publication of the report of the Subcommission of the European Commission on
Human Rights which considered the matter in the event a "friendly solution" is not reached.
If a "solution has not been reached," and the matter has not been referred to the European
Court of Human Rights, the Commission may publish its report in the event it considers that
a violation has occurred and the offending state has not taken "satisfactory measures" within
the "prescribed period" to remedy the situation (Article 32). See supra note 168.
172. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 41(h)(ii). The Inter-American
491
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solution is not reached, the Committee's only recourse is to attempt
to gain the consent of the parties, encouraging them to submit to a
formal conciliation procedure.
73
The effectiveness of the interstate procedure may also be lim-
ited by the time involved in the complaint process. There is no
statute of limitations within which the "complaining state" must
bring the matter to the attention of the "receiving state." After re-
ceipt of the initial communication, the States Parties have six
months within which to reach an "adjustment of the matter." If the
matter is taken to the Human Rights Committee, the Committee is
given twelve months in which to issue a report. If a "solution" is
not reached the matter may be referred to a Conciliation Commis-
sion which is given an additional twelve months to issue a report. 
74
The end result is that human rights violations may not be swiftly
acted upon.
Finally, the interstate complaint procedure is restricted to
those States Parties to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Convention, art. 50 and the European Convention, art. 31 both provide for dissenting opin-
ions in the event an initial settlement is not reached.
173. The original Afro-Asian Amendment Draft, supra note 131, spoke of the Committee
receiving and considering "complaints" by States. In a revised version, "complaint" was
replaced by "communication." The Third Committee apparently tried to eliminate any ter-
minology creating the impression that the Committee would be concerned with "disputes"
and "cases." Draft International Covenants Report, supra note 138, at 92-93, para. 402. In
1953 the Committee on Human Rights adopted a United Kingdom Amendment based on
the provision on the European Commission on Human Rights instructing the Committee, to
"draw up a report on the facts and state its opinion as to whether the facts found disclosed a
breach of the State concerned of its obligations. ... The clause ultimately was deleted.
The present phraseology was adopted 58 in favor, 0 opposed and 24 abstentions, id at 298,
para. 54. The rejection of the language proposed by the United Kingdom seems to have been
based on the belief that a clear distinction should be maintained between the "good offices"
provided by the Committee and judicial functions exercised by the International Court of
Justice. See Mrs. Dick (USA), 18 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1273rd mtg.) 329, para. 20, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3 I/SR. 1273 (1963). At the same time, it was recognized that the threat of judicial scru-
tiny of human rights disputes would be a strong impetus to settlement, between the State
Parties; Miss O'Leary (Ireland), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1429th mtg.) 300, para. 8, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR. 1429 (1966). However, the Committee's "brief statement of facts" might reflect
the Committee's view of the merits of the dispute since, "a brief statement of the facts"
covers facts as ascertained by the Committee. See Mr. Saksena (India), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3
(1428th mtg.) 294, para. 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1428 (1966).
174. See art. 42 infra. The Netherlands proposed an amendment which would have lim-
ited the Committee to considering communications brought within six months from the date
of decision by domestic authorities. See Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, at 107,
para. 446. Subsequently, the Netherlands reconsidered its proposal and concluded that this
might prevent the Committee from examining bonafide communications. Mrs. Zeydner-
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which have recognized the competence of the Committee to receive
and consider communications. 175  However, even if most States
Parties did recognize the competence of the Human Rights Com-
mittee to receive interstate complaints, it is questionable whether
human rights would then be effectively protected. States are not
apt to risk straining diplomatic relations by lodging a complaint
against another State Party, particularly when its own nationals
may not be involved. Such complaints may also open the com-
plaining state to criticism concerning treatment of its own citizens,
as well as strain diplomatic relations with third-party states. Con-
versely, given the ease with which interstate complaints can be
lodged, states may begin to utilize the interstate complaint proce-
dure as a vehicle for embarrassing "unfriendly nations" and attack-
ing competing social systems. This might reduce human rights to a
political issue, with its value limited to being just another tool of
international diplomacy.
76
Schwelb points out that interstate complaint procedures in
other international instruments have rarely been utilized, and then
almost only for political purposes. 177 For instance, since the estab-
lishment of the International Labor Organization (I.L.O.) in 1919,
only two complaints have been filed. t 78  Schwelb also cites three
groups of interstate complaints referred to the European Commis-
sion as evidence of the political nature of the interstate complaint
process: the complaint arising from the tensions associated with
175. As of January 1, 1978, Amnesty International reports that Article 41 had been ac-
cepted by Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, Sweden, and the
United Republic of Norway. Amnesty International Report 1978.
176. The American Convention on Human Rights (Article 44) and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (Article 25) partially avoid the problems associated with the poli-
tics of international diplomacy by providing for the lodging of complaints by individuals and
non-governmental organizations. The argument that the process is too flexible and may en-
courage frivolous complaints and inflame international tensions is put forth by Mr. Ozgur
(Cyprus), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1428th mtg.) 295, para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1428
(1966).
177. Schwelb, supra note 120, at 161.
178. The two cases were a complaint by Ghana against Portugal and a complaint by
Portugal against Liberia. Schwelb remarks that, "It is not difficult to discern that both com-
plaints were motivated by foreign policy considerations of the states concerned." Id. See
Report of the Commission appointed under Article 26 of the I.L.O. Constitution to examine
the complaint filed by the Government of Ghana concerning the observance by the Govern-
ment of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, (1957) (No.105), I.L.O. OF-
FICIAL BULLETIN, SUPP. 11, April 1962 (Vol.45, No.2); and Report of the Commission
appointed under Article 26 of the I.L.O. to examine the complaint filed by the Government
of Portugal concerning the observance by the Government of Liberia of the Forced Labor
Convention, 1930 (No.29), I.L.O. OFFICIAL BULLETIN, Supp. 11. (April 1963) (Vol. 46, No.
2).
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United Kingom sovereignty over Cyprus; 17 9 the complaint stem-
ming from "the status of the German-speaking element in the prov-
ince of Bolzen;' 8°  and the complaint concerning British
treatment18' of Catholics in Northern Ireland.
Schwelb concedes that there are isolated examples, such as the
Greek torture case, where interstate complaints appear to have
been based upon legal and moral, rather than upon political
grounds. 182 It also has been argued that a States' failure to use in-
terstate procedures demonstrates "the responsible attitude taken to-
wards the procedure and its value." The procedure (interstate
complaints under the Covention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination) was a deterrent, encouraging Govern-
ments to quickly remedy any abuse of human rights within their
territory.183 This deterrence argument is difficult to refute, yet it
lacks persuasiveness given the alleged wide-spread human rights
violations in the world. 1
84
C. Conciliation Commission
If a matter referred to the Human Rights Committee in ac-
cordance with Article 41 is not resolved to the "satisfaction" of the
States Parties concerned, the Committee may, "with the prior con-
sent" of the States Parties, appoint an "ad hoc Conciliation Com-
mission."' '  The Commission shall consist of five persons
179. Greece v. United Kingdom [1956] and Greece v. United Kingdom [1957], [1958-59]
Y.B. EUR. CbNv. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 174-99 (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights), Documents
and decisions, 1955-1956-1957, at 128-31.
180. Austria v. Italy, [1961] Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS No. 116 (Eur. Comm.
of Human Rights); id. [1962] at 54; id. [1963] at 740 (Comm. of Ministers).
181. Applications by Ireland of 1971 and 1972. See Communications by the Council of
Europe to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations, Council of Europe.
Doc. H(75) 3 (1975).
182. Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden v. Greece, [1968] Y.B. EUR.
CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS. 690 and 730 (Eur. Comm. of Human Rights), id. [1970] at 108
and 122.
183. Lady Gaitskell (United Kingdom), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1415th mtg.) 223, para. 29,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1415 (1966).
184. See Amnesty International Report 1977 and 1978, supra note 115 detailing abuse of
human rights in over 110 countries in both years.
185. The Human Rights Committee has the authority to take the initiative in soliciting
the "prior consent of the parties," this resulted from a United States amendment, approved
by a narrow majority of the Third Committee, replacing a provision of the Afro-Asian draft
under which convening of an ad hoc Conciliation Commission only would have been possi-
ble "at request" of both parties. The United States amendment was adopted by a vote of 42
in favor, 32 opposed and 19 abstentions. Draft International Covenants Report, supra note
138, at 107, para. 460.
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"acceptable to the States Parties" concerned. If the States Parties
fail to reach agreement within three months on all or part of the
composition of the Commission, the members shall be elected by
secret ballot requiring a two-thirds majority vote of the Human
Rights Committee.' 86 The members of the Commission shall serve
in their "personal capacity," and they shall not be nationals of the
States Parties concerned, nor of a State not a party to the Covenant,
nor of a State which has not made a declaration under the Article
41 inter-state complaint procedure.8 7
The Commission's mandate is to make "its good offices...
available" to the States Parties concerned "with a view to an amica-
ble solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the present
Covenant."' 88 To fulfill this mandate, information received and
collated by the Committee shall be made available to the Commis-
sion, and the Commission may call upon the States Parties con-
cerned to supply any other relevant information.8 9 When the
Commission "has fully considered that matter," but "in any event
not later than twelve months after having been seized of the mat-
ter," it shall submit a report to the Chairman of the Human Rights
Committee. 90 If an "amicable solution" of the matter on the basis
of "respect for human rights" is reached, the Commission shall
confine its report "to a brief statement of the facts and of the solu-
tion reached."' If such an "amicable solution" is not reached, the
Commission's report, "shall embody its findings on all questions of
fact relevant to the issues between the States Parties concerned, and
its view on the possibilities of an amicable solution of the mat-
ter."' 9 2 This report shall also contain the written and oral submis-
sions of the States Parties concerned.' 93 The States Parties shall,
within three months of receipt of the report, notify the Chairman of
the Committee whether or not "they accept the Commission's re-
pt 194
186. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 42(b).
187. Id. art. 42(2).
188. Id. art. 42(1)(a).
189. Id. art. 42(6).
190. Id. art. 42(7).
191. Id. art. 42(a)(b).
192. Schwelb, supra note 120, at 174-77 questions whether "views" was improperly sub-
stituted for "recommendations." The original French sub-amendment read "ses consta-
tions," which Schwelb argues at the time the sub-amendment was offered was said to mean,
"its views," implying to establish, verify, ascertain, note.
193. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, Part IV, art. 40(2).
194. Id. art. 41(1)(a).
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The optional conciliation procedure might be more effective if
it were compulsory. 95 This would encourage States Parties to work
towards dispute settlement during the initial stages so as to avoid
the conciliation requirement. Such settlements might also be en-
couraged if the Conciliation Commission's powers were strength-
ened to enable it to make "such recommendations as the
Commission may think proper for the amicable solution of the dis-
pute." Further, though the Conciliation Commission's report is to
be submitted to the Human Rights Committee, no explicit provi-
sion is made in Article 42 for publication of the report. In addition
to a compulsory and strengthened Conciliation procedure, a wide
distribution of the Committee's report may increase the effective-
ness of the Article 42 procedure. 1
96
Based on his analysis of various international human rights
procedures, Capotorti argues that if human rights instruments are
to be effective, they must provide both an organ empowered to
make a determination on the merits of a situation, and judicial en-
forcement of such determinations.
The higher effectiveness of systems including a clause of
compulsory jurisdiction of an international court needs not to be
[sic] underlined: only such clauses, in fact, ensure a final solu-
tion of the dispute, even though one of the States Parties is inter-
ested in obstructing any legal solution. Moreover, the fact that
the State Party which failed to fulfill its obligations can be bound
to redress the injury, is a concrete measure to guarantee the im-
plementation of the agreement. . . .In the field of human rights,
conciliation has to face the limit of certain principles which can-
not be a subject for compromise .... "'
195. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation does not provide for an intermediate Human Rights Committee "type" process. In-
stead, complaints are to be initially directed to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination which shall "obtain and collate all the information it deems necessary." It is
then transmitted to a five-person ad hoc Conciliation Committee which makes its "good
offices" available with a view "to an amicable solution of the matter" (Article 12 (I)(a)).
After having "fully considered the matter," the Commission shall prepare a report "embody-
ing its findings on all questions of fact relevant to the issue between the parties and contain-
ing such recommendations as it may think proper for the amicable solution of the dispute"
(Article 13 (1)). The report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned for com-
ment and within three months the report and any declarations by the States Parties con-
cerned are to be communicated to the other States Parties to the Convention (Article 13
(2)(3)).
196. One anomaly in the provisions for the Conciliation Committee is Article 12(6) pro-
viding that the States Parties share equally the expenses of the Commission. This would
seem to discourage utilization of the procedure.
197. Capotorti, supra note 116, at 142.
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D. Optional Individual Right To Petition
The draft Covenant submitted by the Commission to the
General Assembly in 1954 did not provide for the right of individ-
ual petition to the Human Rights Committee. 198 At the Twenty-
first session of the General Assembly in 1966, the Netherlands dele-
gation proposed that an article be inserted into the Covenant em-
powering the Human Rights Committee to receive petitions from
individuals or groups of individuals claiming to be victims of a vio-
lation by a State Party, provided that the State Party has declared
the Committee competent to receive such petitions. 99 A group of
Afro-Asian states subsequently offered a similar provision calling
for the right of individual petition2" which was later merged into a
draft provision cosponsored by a cross-section of twelve Member
States.20 The Third Committee decided that the draft should be
included in a separate protocol to be annexed to the Civil and Polit-
ical Covenant. 2  Pursuant to this vote, Nigeria submitted a propo-
sal for a "draft optional protocol" 20 3 to be annexed to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Third
Committee approved the "Optional Protocol '' 2°  which was
adopted by the General Assembly.205 The provision for individual
petition was included in a separate protocol so as not to imply any
recognition of the locus standi of the individual by nation-states
signing, ratifying or acceding to the Covenant.0 6
198. Supra note 116.
199. 21 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 95) 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1335 (1966) Report of the
Third Committee, Note 14, at 119, para. 474, for the introductory statement by the represen-
tative of the Netherlands (Mr. Mommersteeg), see 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1414th mtg.) 217-18,
paras. 24-25.
200. 21 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 62) 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1402 (1966) (Cospon-
sored by Iran, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan).
201. (Cosponsored by Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Jamaica, Iran, Lebanon,
The Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Phillippines and Uruguay) 21 U.N. GAOR (Agenda
Item 62) 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1402/Rev.2 (1966). The text was considered at the 1438th to
1441st meeting of the Third Committee.
202. The vote was 41 for, 39 against with 16 abstentions. 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1440th
mtg.) 379, para. 52, U.N. Doc A/C.3/AR.1440 (1966). See also Draft International Cove-
nants Report, supra note 138, at 123, para. 485.
203. 21 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 62) 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L. 1411 (Nov. 30, 1966). A
revised version of this proposal was cosponsored by Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ghana, Ja-
maica, Lebanon, The Netherlands and the Philippines. U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L. 1411/ Rev. I
and Rev. 2 (Dec. 1, 1966).
204. The vote was 59 for, 2 against and 32 abstentions. 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3. (1451st
mtg.) 450, para. 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1451 (1966).
205. 21 U.N. GAOR (1496th plen. mtg.) 6, para. 60, U.N. Doc. A/Pv. 1496 (1966).
206. The Third Committee had originally decided to include the draft article on individ-
ual petition in a "separate" protocol "annexed" to the Covenant. Eventually, the view pre-
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Schwelb notes that "[tihe drafting of a separate protocol made
it possible to achieve the unanimous adoption of the Covenant and
the adoption of the Protocol by a very great majority, against only
two votes [Niger and Togo], albeit with a large number of absten-
tions."2 °7 As of January 1978 there were fourty-four parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, only sixteen
of whom were parties to the Optional Protocol.20 8 On the other
hand, as of 1 May 1978 there were one hundred States Parties to the
International Covention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, only five of whom had accepted the Covention's
optional procedure for individual petition included within the Ra-
cial Discrimination Covenant. 20 9 Based on these statistics, it might
be argued that creating a separate Protocol has placed pressure on
states to sign both the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Optional Protocol. If the optional right of petition
vailed "that it was impossible to have a Protocol both 'separate' and 'annexed.'" Mrs.
Saksena (India), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1451st mtg.) 453-54, para. 62, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/
SR. 1451 (1966). Mr. Schreiber, the Director of the Division of Human Rights, made it clear
that the Covenant and the Protocol were separate instruments, although they were substan-
tially related, since only parties to the Covenant could become parties to the Protocol. It
should be noted that International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 1966, recognizes the right of individual petition within the main text (Article
14). The American Convention on Human Rights provides for an optional interstate com-
plaint procedure (Article 45) and a mandatory provision for petition by individuals and non-
governmental organizations (Article 44). In reference to the procedures for individual peti-
tion under the Covenant on Racial Discrimination and the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Capotorti observes,
[tihe most interesting difference is that the Committee for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination has more restricted powers to declare an individual communication
admissible; in particular, the Convention does not make reference to any abuse of
the right of petition. At the end of the procedure, the Committee may transmit its
Isuggestions and recommendations' to the State concerned and to the individual:
these terms are more precise than the word 'views' used in the Protocol and imply a
greater degree of authority on the part of the Committee. It is also to be noted that
each Party to the Convention may entrust a new or existing domestic body with the
task of a preliminary consideration of individual petitions.
Capotorti, supra note 116, at 143, 144.
207. Schwelb, supra note 120, at 179. Schwelb goes on to note that apart from such
practical considerations that there is no legal difference between inclusion of the optional
right of individual petition within the body of a treaty and inclusion of the right of petition in
a separate Protocol. He observes that in addition, in both cases ratification of the main
instrument is required as a condition precedent to recognition of the right of individual peti-
tion.
208. Amnesty International, supra note 115, at 50. The interstate complaint procedure
interestingly has only been adopted by six states. The optional right of individual petition in
the Racial Discrimination Convention has only been accepted by 5 states.
209. UNITED NATIONS, TOWARDS A WORLD WITHOUT RACISM 6 (1978). Admittedly
there was an international consensus concerning the desirability of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
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had been included within the Covenant, the pressure to accept the
right of individual petition might not exist.
210
The substantive provisions of the Optional Protocol are bind-
ing on all States Parties to the Covenant that recognize the compe-
tence of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider
communications from individuals I.2 1  The Committee shall not
consider any communication from an individual claiming to be a
"victim" unless it has ascertained that: the individual has ex-
hausted all available domestic remedies; application of such reme-
dies is unreasonably prolonged; and it has determined that the
same matter is not being examined under another procedure of "in-
ternational investigation or settlement."'21 2 In addition, the Com-
mittee shall not consider any anonymous communication, or any
communication which is considered to be an abuse of the right of
submission,213 or which is "incompatible" with the provisions of
the Covenant.21 4
If none of the obstacles set forth in Articles 3 and 5 prohibit
Committee action, the communication will be brought to the atten-
tion of the State Party "alleged to be violating the Covenant."
2' 1 5
Within six months after receipt of the communication, the "receiv-
ing state" shall submit to the Committee written "explanations or
statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if any, that may
have been taken by that State."2 6 The Committee shall consider
210. Additional evidence substantiating this point is the fact that only six states have
accepted the interstate complaint procedure which is contained "within" the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
211. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 1. Initially the term "petition" is
used, supra note 200. "Petition" was changed later to "communication," supra note 201, at 1.
The delegate from France urged this modification, since "petition" was only available under
the Trusteeship System. See statement by Mr. Paolini (France), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1418th
mtg.) 242, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1418 (1966). See United Nations Charter Article
87(b). However, this modification in language was interpreted as implying no substantive
change, Mr. Gros Espiell (Urguay), 21 U.N. GAOR, C.3 (1438th mtg.) 364, para. 44, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/SR.1438 (1966). The American Convention on Human Rights refers to "peti-
tions" or "communications" (Article 48). The European Convention on Human Rights pro-
vides for submission of "petitions" (Article 27) and the International Convention of the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in Article 14 refers to "communications"
while Article 14(7)(a)(b) describes the initiating party as the "petitioner."
212. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 5(2)(a)(b).
213. Technically the Protocol distinguishes between grounds which make petition "inad-
missible" and grounds on which the Committee "shall not consider a communication." The
major distinction appears to be that "inadmissible" communications are not brought to the
attention of the State Party involved.
214. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 3.
215. Id. art, 4(1).
216. Id. art. 4(2).
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communications received "in the light of all written information
made available to it by the individual and by the State Party con-
cerned."21 7 The Committee shall hold closed meetings when exam-
ining communications under the present Protocol and "shall
forward its views" to the State Party and individual concerned.218
1. Problems With Initiating Individual Claims. Although the
Optional Protocol should be applauded as a long needed progres-
sive step in human rights, there are a number of procedural short
comings which will probably limit the Covenant's effectiveness.
The first obvious difficulty with the Optional Protocol is that an
individual's right of petition is dependent upon whether the State
which allegedly violated the individual's human rights is a party to
the Protocol. The States Parties which are the greatest violators of
human rights are probably the least likely to grant the right of peti-
tion to individuals.2 19 In addition, only individuals subject to
States Parties jurisdiction have standing to bring a communication.
Even assuming a "victim" is aware of the provisions of the Op-
tional Protocol, "victims" imprisoned or tortured (or those who
have been fatally injured) are not apt to be in a position to submit
petitions.22 ° "Victim" is also an ambiguous term which arguably
encompasses individuals in prison, individual readers of a newspa-
per closed by government order, a third party closely associated
with a prisoner, or an individual living in a state whose government
217. Id. art. 5(1).
218. Id. art. 5(3)(4). "Views" was preferred by the U.N. General Assembly to the seem-
ingly stronger term "suggestions" contained in the initial draft. Tardu, The Protocol to the
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-.4merican System. A Study
of Co-Existing Petition Procedures, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 778, 780-81 (1976), citing U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/L. 1402. Rev. 2 and U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1411/Rev.2(I) (1966). Under the Optional
Protocol the Committee offers its "views" on the substance of the matter as opposed to the
Article 42 interstate communication provisions under which the ad hoc Conciliation Com-
mission reports its "Findings" on the relevant facts and its "views on the possibilities of an
amicable solution of the matter." Tardu argues that "views" in the Optional Protocol en-
compasses "judgments as to the conformity of conduct of the state with the covenant." Id. at
781.
219. Bilder, Rethinking International Human Rights. Some Basic Questions, 1969 Wis. L.
REV. 171, 205. See note 248 infra. It should be noted that Article 10 extends the Protocol to
"all parts of federal states without any limitiations or exceptions." This presents problems
for States Parties which are federally constituted states with limited delegations of power to
the central government.
220. A related requirement is that the harm suffered by the "victim" must have occurred
after the Optional Protocol has entered into force within the State Party against whom the
petition is lodged. See 14 U.N. CHRONICLE, supra note 151, at 42. Another problem is
determining how far the concept of "state action" should extend.
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has been overthrown. It is also important to provide some protec-
tion to "potential victims."
The harshness of the requirement that complainants be "vic-
tims" of a human rights violation is tempered by a 1977 ruling of
the Human Rights Committee permitting communications to be
submitted by the "victim" or his or her "representative." The
Committee may agree to consider a communication submitted on
behalf of an alleged "victim" when it appears that the "victim" is
unable to personally submit the communication. The "representa-
tive" then has the burden of demonstrating the grounds and cir-
cumstances justifying the action on behalf of the victim.22I The
extent to which this interpretation will increase individual access to
the Committee depends upon the breadth of the Committee's inter-
pretation of "representative," and of the grounds and circumstances
which are deemed to justify "representatives" acting on behalf of
an alleged "victim."
Associated with confining standing to "victims," is the require-
ment that they be subject to the jurisdiction of the State Party
charged with violating the requirements of the Covenant. It ap-
pears that an individual has no remedy under the Optional Proto-
col if a State Party violates the individual's rights while the
individual is outside the territorial jurisdiction of that State.222
Assuming that a "victim's" rights have been violated while
subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party to the Optional Protocol,
the individual or the individual's "representative" may submit a
written communication to the Committee. Such communications
are inadmissible if, among other reasons, they are "incompatible
[e.g. 'outside'] with the provisions of the Covenant. ' 223 This provi-
sion assumes individual "victims" have a familiarity with the sub-
stantive provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
221. Id.
222. "The conclusion seems inescapable that the scope of the procedural protection af-
forded by the Protocol cannot be wider than that of the Covenant." Schwelb, supra note 120,
at 180-81. Under Article 2(1) of the Covenant a State Party shall respect and ensure the
rights recognized in the Covenant to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction. The words "within its territory" thus apply as a limitation in the Optional Pro-
tocol. It also should be noted that such a "territorial limitation" does not appear in any other
major human rights instrument.
223. The Article 3 requirement of not allowing anonymous communications is defensible
in that it prevents communications submitted in "bad faith." However, it also may subject
complainants to reprisals. The inadmissibility of anonymous submissions, considered by
"the Committee to be an abuse of the right of submission," would appear to permit exclusion
of "trivial," "inflammatory" communications, and those submitted for the purpose of
"harassing" State Parties.
52
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1980], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss3/3
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Political Rights. In addition, "incompatibility" is a question of le-
gal interpretation, which the Human Rights Committee, a nonjudi-
cial organ, is ill-equipped to undertake. Domestic courts have long
struggled with the scope of rights contained in the Covenant, such
as the "right of peaceful assembly," "freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," and "freedom of
thought, conscience and religion." For instance, the Committee
may have to determine whether "freedom of thought, conscience
and religion" encompasses the "right to conscientious objection" to
"war in any form" or to a "particular war." Even if it does, there is
the further question of whether the right of "particular conscien-
tious objection" would be qualified by Article 18(3), which subjects
"the freedom of thought, conscience and religion" to limitations
"prescribed by law" that are "necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others."
The Committee also "shall not consider" any communication
from an individual "unless it has ascertained that all domestic rem-
edies have been exhausted," (unless such remedies are "unreasona-
bly prolonged"), and unless the same matter is not being examined
"under another procedure of internal investigation or settlement."
The exhaustion requirement seems to be designed to clarify issues,
economize resources, insure efficiency and respect state sovereignty.
The application of the exhaustion requirement has been criticized
in cases where individuals may be subjected to denials of life and
liberty.
One assumes that the domestic remedies rule has been in-
corporated into the. . . procedure for a purpose, but the purpose
remains unclear. . . . It was born in a commercial world for the
protection of states confronted with suits by other states espous-
ing claims of their nationals and is still applied in that con-
text. . . The relief sought in commercial claims is generally
money; in human rights cases, it is generally life or liberty.
There are serious problems facing the individual who at-
tempts domestic remedies for a violation of human rights by his
government . . . . [If] governmental authority is being chal-
lenged, the pursuit . . . is likely to be futile; furthermore, the
individual may be placing himself in great personal dan-
ger. . .. 224
224. Manke, The Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies in the United Nations Subcommirsion
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The exhaustion requirement might be modified in cases where
there is the possibility of "immediate and or irreparable harm" to
the complainant.
The Committee also "shall not consider" a communication if
"the same matter" is being "examined under another procedure of
international investigation or settlement." The question arises
whether the bar against considering "the same matter" might be
interpreted as to impede the Committee's effectiveness under the
Optional Protocol. For instance, it may preclude Committee con-
sideration of an individual communication alleging inhumane con-
ditions of incarceration in a State Party's prisons if the general
conditions in the State Party's prisons are under investigation by
the United Nations Human Rights Commission. The Covenant's
provision for deference to other international bodies seems to be
designed to economize the Committee's resources and to clarify the
issues in dispute prior to the consideration by the Human Rights
Committee. If the Committee chooses not to defer, but reviews and
disagrees with the findings of another tribunal, or conducts its own
de novo investigation, such action could waste the Committee's re-
sources and damage its prestige. The solution to the problem of
priority among competing international human rights procedures
would seem to lie in standardization of international organizational
practices.
225
Once a communication is brought to the attention of the State
225. Tardu, supra note 218, at 784-85 offers a comprehensive discussion of the problem
of competing international procedures. The preparatory work in the Third Committee of the
U.N. General Assembly in 1966 manifested a trend toward a stronger assertion of the powers
of the Human Rights Committee vir-d- vis competing international procedures. The principle
una via elecia was gradually abandoned in favor of the present system of adjournment of
proceedings pendente life. An initial draft of the article would have precluded action by the
Human Rights Committee in all cases where any implementation procedures set forth in
other instruments would have been invoked. Id. at 784, citing U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1399.
The proposal was withdrawn after many delegates had expressed the view that the proposal
would unjustifiably place the Human Rights Committee in a subsidiary position vis-a-vir
competing organs, and for all intents and purposes, "nullify" the Committee. Id, citing
Records of the 1432nd and 1433rd Meetings of the Third Committee, U.N. Docs. A/C.3/
SR. 1433, para. 12. Later on in the debates amendments were put forward providing that the
Human Rights Committee would not consider complaints from individuals if the same mat-
ter had already been "submitted" to another procedure of international investigation or set-
tlement. Id., citing U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/L. 1355, para. 2 and A/C.3/L. 1402/ Rev.2. This
formula was revised to include the language "is being examined." U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.
141 1/Rev.2. The present formula finally was adopted with 54 votes in favor, none opposed
and 29 abstentions. Id., citing Summary Record of the 1446th Meeting of the Third Com-
mittee, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1446. Tardu argues that the Committee would be authorized
to consider a communication even if the matter is being examined under a competing inter-
national procedure if the Committee feels the competing procedure is "unreasonably pro-
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Party concerned, the "receiving state" has six months to submit to
the Committee written explanations, or statements clarifying the
matter and the remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that
State.226 Six months appears to be too extended a period within
which to respond in situations involving emergencies or irreparable
harm. Provision should be made in such situations for an expe-
dited response and some form of injunctive relief.
The Committee is to consider communications and States Par-
ties' responses in "closed meetings. ' 227 However, unlike the Article
41 interstate complaint procedures, no provision is made in the Op-
tional Protocol for any representatives of the parties concerned to
be present when the Committee is considering "the matter." This
places the alleged "victim" at a disadvantage, since "victims" usu-
ally do not have the resources available to States Parties. Without
some form of representation and procedural rights during commit-
tee deliberations, "victims" are unlikely to be able to successfully
rebut the contentions of States Parties.
228
The Human Rights Committee's ability to fulfill its responsi-
bilities under the Optional Protocol is limited by the fact that its
resources must be divided between performing its responsibilities
under Articles 40, 41 and 42 and under the Optional Protocol. The
Committee appears designed primarily to perform nonjudicial,
fact-finding and conciliation roles under Articles 40, 41 and 42.
Yet, under the Optional Protocol the Committee is also required to
serve a quasi-judicial function and "forward its views" to the State
Party and individual concerned. It is open to question whether
committee members, in "formulating their views," can resist the in-
fluence of their own governments, or their own political views on
the concept of individual petition.229 On the other hand, even if the
Committee's "views" are adverse to a State Party, the Committee
longed." Id., citing Summary Records of the 1441st and 1446th Meetings of the Third
Committee, U.N. Docs. A/C.3/SR. 1441, para. 20 and A/C.3/SR. 1446, para. 16.
226. It is not clear whether the Committee will examine the adequacy of the remedy
provided. For instance, a state only may provide for a conciliation or an arbitration remedy
and not provide compensation for parties whose rights have been violated. In such a case the
question arises whether the Committee would analyze the adequacy of the remedy provided
the complaining party.
227. Civil and Political Covenant, supra note 101, art. 5(3).
228. There is no provision in the Protocol for informing individual "victims" that their
petition has been received; of the response by the State Party concerned; or when the matter
will be heard. For a discussion of the problems faced by poorly educated defendants, see P.
DROST, supra note 5, at 112-13.
229. There is no provision for dissenting opinions.
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has no ability to enforce its judgment.23 °
IV. AN EVALUATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Critics of the United Nations human rights instruments have
suggested evaluation efforts may "preempt a disproportionate share
of the limited time and energy for human rights work." They con-
tend that the instruments may "foster a harmful illusion of accom-
plishment" and "serve as an excuse for failure to pursue more
practical courses of action." 23'
In contrast, Schwelb views the United Nations' human rights
instruments as an important first step towards protection of univer-
sal human rights.
[W]ith all its deficiencies and its lack of system and symmetry,
the work of the United Nations in the human rights field has,
from its beginnings, been a dynamic and by no means insignifi-
cant operation ...
[W]hile the conclusion of international treaties does not in itself
guarantee that they will in practice be respected, they certainly
are a step towards this goal. As to 'declarations,' . . . [they] may
by custom, become recognized as laying down rules binding
230. Capotorti, supra note 116, at 144, observes that the shortcomings of the Protocol
must be appreciated in the context of the Protocol's bold provision for individual petition:
If we think of the deep reluctance on the part of governments to be placed on
the same level as the individuals, before an international body, we shall fully real-
ize the importance of the petition procedure, and at the same time the difficulty to
make [sic] it more efficient. This difficulty is even greater because the said proce-
dure could bring to a comparison between the point of view of a State Party and
that of one of its nationals, both of which must be equally and carefully considered
by the competent international body, when all the State's domestic remedies have
been exhausted without giving satisfaction to the individual. If we bear this in
mind, it will be easy to understand the optional character of the petition machinery.
Capotorti, goes on to argue that the non-judicial character of the Protocol dictates that the
Committee be confined to exercising "modest powers."
[W]ere individual petitions to be followed by more adequate international acts, in-
cluding the condemnation of the State which has failed to observe its obligations, it
would be absolutely necessary to ascertain the facts and to implement the relevant
clauses of the agreement through a judiciary proceeding. In fact, as long as the
examination of the petitions is entrusted to a non-judiciary organ and is carried out
on the basis of a restricted investigation, without the guarantees connected with
judicial proceedings, it will logically be concluded only with suggestions and rec-
ommendations, or with the expression of "views" from the competent organ, which
have a political more than a legal value.
Id. Bilder, supra note 219, at 211 suggests that the Optional Protocol should not be viewed
as a mechanism to be used in all cases of violation of human rights, but that it should be used
"... where the exercise of the right of petition is likely to prove in effect a class action,
revealing and potentially remedying pervasive human rights denials, it would seem capable
of promoting human rights in a significant way."
231. Id. at 205.
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upon States. . . . [S]urveys, studies and reports . ..are 'not
only a source of information, but also a valuable incentive to
Governments' efforts to protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms.'
232
Bilder points out that instruments, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, might raise general stan-
dards of international conduct and place pressure on governments
to implement internal reforms.
Arguments favouring reliance on declarations and conventions
emphasize that they define the content of human rights concepts
and establish clearer standards of governmental conduct. They
educate both officials and the general public in these norms,
place governments failing to respect human rights on the defen-
sive, and help create and legitimate internal and external pres-
sure for human rights improvement. Conventions lift general
standards to the level of concrete binding rules.
Perhaps most important, declarations may stimulate and conven-
tions require, enactment of internal legislation to implement ap-
plicable human rights standards. . . . In some cases they may
help a government to legitimate reforms it itself wishes to under-
take. Even where such legislation is initially pro forma, it tends
over time to have a growing normative impact.
233
Other scholars, while appreciating the importance of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, feel that its effec-
tiveness is limited by the Covenant's obvious shortcomings. Clark
finds a number of areas "in which the present situation is unsatis-
factory. "234
1. Principles are formulated in treaty form but this is not fol-
lowed by ratification by all, or even by a majority of states.
2. Ratified Treaties are not given practical application.
3. Enforcement procedures contained in the treaties are lim-
ited.
4. 'Communications' receive cavalier treatment.
5. Limited sources of information are available to United Na-
tions human rights bodies.
6. Only limited use is made of NGO assistance and representa-
tion [this overlaps with 4 and 5].
7. There is a meagre response to requests for periodic reports
232. Schwelb, Remarks at International Conference About the European Convention on
Human Rights, Vienna, Australia October 18-20, 1965, in A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at
307-17.
233. Bilder, supra note 219, at 205.
234. R. CLARK, supra note 57. See also Bilder, The International Promotion ofHuman
Rights :A Current Assessment, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1964).
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and ineffective techniques for dealing with those received. 235
Unlike Clark, Capotorti focuses on the Covenant's inadequate
implementation procedures.
(a) The periodic reports by the States are the subject of a
superficial consideration which shall lead only to recommenda-
tions of a general nature.
(b) The procedure for settlement of disputes is essentially
based on goodwill of the states can be interrupted by either State
Party to the dispute before the Conciliation Commission has
been appointed, and does not include any possibility of unilat-
eral application to a judiciary organ [sic].
(c) Individual petitions can easily be considered as
unadmissible [sic], by the receiving organ, and even if they are
admitted, they are not followed up by an investigation of the
facts or by ascertainment of the alleged violation: the Human
Rights Committee shall confine itself to express its views.
2 36
Capotorti concludes
that the reports .. rather than control measures, are a means of
information. . . .As to the procedure for the settlement of dis-
putes provided for in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
it is nothing but a prolonged attempt of conciliation, while the
examination of petitions provided for in the Optional Protocol
represents only a means for political pressure, which is far from
being too strong.23 7
These shortcomings in the International Convenant on Civil
and Political Rights are, in part, a reflection of the fact that the
"United Nations is neither an objective Tribunal nor a world gov-
ernment, but a political organization. . . . The result is a politi-
calization of human rights.
23 8
[S]tates still guard their national sovereignty dogmatically and
they have yet to perceive a common interest in internationalizing
and institutionalizing implementation measures; and. . . the po-
sition of the individual in international law is still anamalous, for
while he is considered the object of international law, many
states still refuse to consider him an appropriate subject of inter-
national law so as to entitle him to invoke the international ma-
chinery on his own behalf.
23 9
235. R. CLARK, supra note 57, at 39.
236. Capotorti, supra note 116, at 146.
237. Id.
238. Saario and Cass, The United Nations and the International Protection of Human
Rights . A Legal Analysis and Interpretation, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 591, 606 (1977).
239. Nanda, Implementation o/Human Rights by the United Nations and Regional Organi-
zations, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 307, 321 (1971).
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The Civil and Political Covenant may then be viewed as a po-
litical document rather than as a legal declaration. The Covenant
should be seen as a symbolic commitment by states to human
rights. Perhaps, for that reason the implementation procedures
may be deliberately full of "vague standards, crippling exceptions
and numerous escape hatches."'"
The politicalization of human rights in the United Nations is
reflected in the fact that serious discussions of both civil and politi-
cal rights have tended to concentrate on those "politically safe"
areas where there is international consensus-opposition to
apartheid and anticolonialism.
[W]hile [smaller nations] frequently demonstrate great concern
over apartheid and colonialism and vote for stern meas-
ures against the violation of human rights in South Africa and
Rhodesia, they do not show a similar concern over violations of
human rights in other settings. In the latter situations their ap-
proach is invariably cautious, and their recommendations are for
considerably weaker measures of implementation.24'
Many flagrant examples of human rights violations are passed
over in silence while the transgressions of one nation are singled
out for overwhelming opprobrium. . . . [G]overmments tend to
express such concern only if a showing of official outrage over
the violations would be likely to serve some political interest.242
The Civil and Political Covenant also suffers because the sub-
stantive human rights provisions of the Covenant contain a liberal
democratic ideological bias. This bias results from the fact that the
Covenant was drafted prior to the entry of over fifty new, largely
third-world states into the United Nations. As a result, the values
of Western industrialized countries are dominant. In addition, the
Covenant was drafted in part as an expostfacto statement of allied
war aims during World War II. Professor Inis L. Claude Jr. views
the Covenant's provisions as "hastily generalized from immediately
preceeding experience. . . [and as] an attempt to equip the world
240. Bilder, supra note 219, at 206. MacChesney, Should the United States Ratify the
Covenants? A4 Question of Merits Not of Constitutional Law, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 912, 914
(1968). MacChesney notes,
[lit is somewhat ironic to note that the voting majorities that extended the scope of
the substantive provisions at the same time weakened considerably the provisions
for enforcement, particularly with respect to the final implementation provisions in
the Civil and Political Covenant.
MacChesney's comment suggests States saw the Covenant primarily as a political rather than
as a legal document.
241. Nanda, supra note 239, at 322.
242. Saario and Cass, supra note 238, at 606-07.
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for dealing with Hitler-after Hitler was already dead." '24 3
Thus, the Covenant has catalogued activities, and labeled
them as "rights," with little clarification as to the rationale, scope
and nature of such categorization. 244 The confusion surrounding
the concept of human rights is reflected in the statement that:
"[Miuch has been said about them [human rights], and yet one may
still be left wondering what they are. '' 24 Bilder observes that this
definitional problem is "not trivial . . . [and that] what we think
human rights really are will inevitably influence not only our judg-
ment as to which types of claims to recognize as human rights, but
also our expectations and programs for implementation and com-
pliance with these standards.' ' 24' A hierarchy must also be struc-
tured for ranking conflicting rights, and for determining which new
"claims" qualify as "human rights." The arbitrary categorization
of a variety of spheres of activity as rights can only lead to frustra-
tion and disillusionment with United Nations human rights activi-
241ties.
In short, the human rights vocabulary is marked by ambiguity
and imprecision. It invites political, not legal, discourse and
sanctions capricious conduct on the part of local and interna-
tional authorities because it does not provide juridical standards
for the definition of rights and their violations ...
The phrase 'human rights' does not refer to legal propositions or
to realities as these are perceived today. In its most positive
meaning it institutes a list of desires, political goals, or ideologi-
cal commitments. Read negatively, but equally justifiably it may
be likened to a paper blanket covering up the absence of real and
enforceable rights of the kind customary under Western constitu-
tionalism.248
United Nations activities have emphasized the drafting and
243. I.L. CLAUDE JR., SWORDS INTO PLOW SHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 70-71 (3rd ed. 1964).
244. See McDougal, Lasswell and Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order:. Human
Rights in Comprehensive Context, 72 Nw.U.L. REV. 227, 281 (1977); Nanda, supra note 239,
at 308; Bilder, supra note 219, at 173-74.
245. M. CRANSTON, supra note 5, at 1.
246. Bilder, supra note 219, at 174.
247. For discussion of the definition of a human right see Benn, Rights, 7 ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA OF PHILOSOPHY 195-99 (D. Edwards ed. 1967); Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969); D. BRAYBROOKE, THREE TESTS FOR DEMOCRACY (1968);
M. CRANSTON, supra note 5; Feinberg, Duties, Rights and Claims, 3 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY 137-44 (1966).
248. Bozeman, Understanding the Communist Threat, in A. Said ed., supra note 15, at
144-49.
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ratification of human rights resolutions and covenants.249 The pro-
tection of civil and political rights must involve increased interna-
tional efforts to create a socio-economic environment within each
nation-state which is compatible with the dignity of the individ-
ual.250 The protection of human rights is fundamentally a problem
of domestic implementation and politics. A greater effort must be
made towards linking international and domestic protections.
[Miore emphasis should be given to advisory services types of
programs such as technical advice, education and seminars; to
meaningful reporting by countries; and to first-rate and realistic
studies of a particular countrys' problems. More work might be
done at such elementary levels as encouraging the formation of
national groups interested in human rights: promoting legal-aid
programs; and helping such primary level official agencies as lo-
cal police, school teachers, village magistrates, and tribal chief-
tains to better understand what in practice human rights on the
local level mean.
Countries should be encouraged to assign competent
and well informed people to international human rights work.25'
Protection of civil and political rights requires the develop-
ment of techniques for international fact-finding, and for effective
use of publicity and world public opinion. "Experience shows that
governments are in fact sensitive to world opinion, and it is often
the only weapon at our disposal. ' 2 2 In short, the Human Rights
Committee must become an "active" rather than a "passive" organ.
It must also initiate studies and publicize its findings. A more ag-
gressive role for the Human Rights Committee might entail greater
support for nongovernmental organizations, which are, in many
cases, a politically neitral force capable of bringing public opinion
to bear on governments.253
249. See generally Fisher, Bringing Law to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130
(1961).
250. The influence of such factors is recognized in the proclamation of Teheran, Final
Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 (1968).
See Trubek, When i An Omlet? What s An Egg? Some Thoughts on Economic Development
and Human Rights in Latin America, in SIXTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW No. 5 98 (1973); and WachteL The Epoch of Socialism
and the Integration of World Capitalism, id. at 221.
251. Bilder, supra note 234, at 732-33.
252. Id. at 733.
253. See Weissbrot, The Role of lnternational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Im-
plementation of Human Rights, 12 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 293 (1977); Green, NGO's, in A. Said ed.,
supra note 15, at 304-17; Luard, Conclusion, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 304-17; Prasad,
The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the New United Nations Procedures for
Human Rights Complaints, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & P. 441 (1975).
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1. Possible Reforms. Most importantly, the substantive pro-
visions and implementation procedures in the International Conve-
nant on Civil and Political Rights must be reexamined. A number
of reforms have been suggested, some of which deserve serious
study and analysis by human rights activists and scholars.
1. The establishment of a United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights has been proposed. Generally, the various propos-
als view the High Commissioner as an ombudsman who collects
and examines information on human rights in various states and
who serves as an advocate for human rights throughout the
world.254
2. A related proposal calls for the creation of a United Nations
Organization for the Promotion of Human Rights (UNOPHR)
whose main organ would be a Human Rights Council. The crea-
tion of this organization is designed to emphasize the importance of
human rights and provide for their efficient protection.
255
3. Another structural reform calls for the creation of a Human
Rights Assembly in which the peoples of the United Nations would
be directly represented in a permanent world forum. The assembly
would discuss human rights problems, advise the General Assem-
bly, and serve as a liaison with national parliaments.256
4. A proposal requiring extensive study is the creation of a World
Court of Human Rights empowered to issue binding decrees in dis-
putes concerning human rights. This proposal entails consideration
of the efficacy and role of law in protecting human rights.25 7
5. A variant of the World Court of Human Rights is the proposed
concept of a "World Habeas Corpus" for any imprisoned individ-
ual.2
58
254. See R. CLARK supra note 57; Etra, International Protection of Human Rights. The
Proposalfor a United Nations High Commissioner, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 150 (1966);
Fawcett, Remarks at International Conference about the European Convention on Human
Rights, Vienna, Austria October 18-20, 1965, in A. Robertson, ed., supra note 5, at 289-99.
M. MOSKOWITZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER 137-52 (1959); Newman, Ombudsmen
and Human Rights: the New U.N. Treaty Proposals, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 951 (1967).
255. Sohn, United Nations Machineryfor Implementing Human Rights, 62 AM. J. INT'L L.
909, 909-10 (1968).
256. Id. at 910-11.
257. A. Goldberg, The Needfor a World Court of Human Rights, II How. L.J. 621
(1965); Luard, Conclusion, in E. Luard ed., supra note 5, at 304-10; MacBride, The Strength-
ening of International Machineryfor the Protection of Human Rights, in E. Luard ed., supra
note 5, at 149-62.
258. Kutner, The Legal Ultimatefor the Unity of Mankind, in L. Kutner ed.,supra note 5.
See also Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L.J. 525
(1963), Kutner, World Habeas Corpus." LegalAbsolutefor Survival, 39 U. DET. L.J. 279
(1962).
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6. It has also been suggested that the approach of protecting
human rights through comprehensive declarations and covenants
be replaced by an incremental strategy entailing the drafting of in-
struments protecting particular rights which have wide-spread in-
ternational support and which can be enforced effectively.259
7. A further suggestion is that human rights could be more effec-
tively enforced through application of criminal sanctions on gov-
ernment officials responsible for human rights violations.
2 60
8. Strong arguments have been made that human rights can only
be effectively protected in a regional context where countries share
common values and traditions, and appreciate one another's
problems. The regionalization of human rights raises the question
whether such "fragmentation" of international human rights activi-
ties is advisable.26'
9. Discussion must take place concerning human rights in bilat-
eral foreign policy, and consideration must be given to whether
multilateral lending institutions should consider human rights crite-
ria in their decisionmaking.
262
10. The same approach cannot be used to effectively protect all
human rights, and innovative techniques must be considered.
These techniques might include the use of economic incentives to
encourage human rights protection, the designation of artists and




The problems encountered in drafting and implementing the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights suggests that
the document is largely a symbolic attempt at an international com-
259. E.B. HAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION (1970).
260. See J. CAREY, supra note 5, at 61-69.
261. Bilder, supra note 219, at 215-16. Buergenthal, International and Regional Human
Rights Law and Institutions.. Some Examples of Their Interaction, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321
(1977).
262. See Kissinger, Continuity and Change in American Foreign Policy, The Arthur K.
Salomon Lecture, New York University, in A. Said ed., supra note 15, at 154. For United
States statutory provisions incorporating Human Rights see Salzberg and Young, The Parlia-
mentary Role in Implementing International Human Rights: A U.S. Example, 12 TEX. INT'L.
L.J. 251, 265-74 (1977).
263. Bilder, supra note 219, at 216-17, writes that
The diversity of problems and goals, embracing much of human social experience,
suggests the need for a similar diversity of approaches, tailored to particular needs,
conditions, resources and possibilities.
See also Bilder, supra note 234, at 733.
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mitment to the well-being of individuals. The Covenant lacks pro-
cedures for effective fact-finding, for decisions on the merits of a
complaint, and fails to provide for the authoritative sanctioning
and public exposure of human rights violations.264 In addition, the
Covenant's substantive provisions are imprecise and reflect a lib-
eral-democratic bias.
A legal approach to human rights protection is limited by the
fact that human rights violations are intertwined with problems of
economic and political development. No agreement has been
reached as to what other techniques might be effectively applied at
the international level to protect human rights. Economic sanctions
may hurt populations indiscriminately, damage the world econ-
omy, and create dangerous precedents. The use of force violates
basic international norms and may lead to global destruction. The
propagation of adverse publicity may make a Nation more intransi-
gent, while expulsion from an international organization may inter-
fere with attempts at establishing a dialogue and exerting subtle
persuasion. Diplomatic pressure may lead to a politicalization of
human rights and denigrate the concept of human rights. In addi-
tion, states probably could not agree on when or if nations would
be justified in derogating from human rights principles in certain
situations.265
The human rights movement has now officially marked its
thirtieth anniversary. Thus far, the aspirations for the achievement
of human rights have not been matched by authoritative provisions
for expression of such ideals. The world may thus look forward to
the popular movements for freedom continuing to be met by gov-
ernmental repression and international apathy.
264. Bilder, supra note 219, at 206.
265. The most sophisticated research agenda is contained in McDougal, Human Rights
and World Public Order. Human Rights in Comprehensive Context, 72 Nw.U.L. REv. 227, at
280-307. But see Wood, Public Order and Political Integration in Contemporary International
Theory, 14 VA. J. INTL L. 423 (1974); Little, Toward Clarifying the Grounds of Value -
Clarfcation 4 Reaction to the Policy-Oriented Jursprudence of Lasswell and McDougal, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 451 (1974). The most comprehensive discussion of techniques for safeguard-
ing Human Rights is contained in J. CAREY, supra note 5.
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